

pressure can be exerted, the theoretical jurisdiction of the C.T.C. over tolls may be meaningless, since it can be argued that the tolls are only charged for the U.S. half of the bridge. An example of this is the Sault Ste Marie Bridge where in 1968 the return toll was increased from \$1.80 to \$3.00, and Canada could not block the increase since all powers had been assigned to the U.S. company and tolls were collected on the U.S. side. This problem will presumably persist until the Canadian half of each bridge reverts to Canada and regulatory controls can be applied.

8. Problems involving Customs and Immigration facilities.

In the case of most toll structures, the bridge operator is required to provide the Canadian Customs and Immigration authorities with suitable facilities and to maintain these in good condition. It appears, however, that in some cases, the bridge authorities are not cooperative, and the standard of maintenance is low with consequent friction between bridge staff and federal officials. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that on the U.S. side, the U.S. government provides its own facilities. Of course, where the Canadian half of the bridge is operated by a body which is clearly under Canadian jurisdiction, this problem can be quickly eliminated. At the present time, however, when few bridges are in this category, the only clear solution would be to formalize the standards by establishing regulations and this would, of course, require bridge legislation creating clear Federal Government control over international bridge activities in Canada. Alternatively, the Government should assume responsibility for providing its own facilities.

9. Right to charge tolls after retirement of bonds and subsequent reversion.

This problem has arisen in cases where a commitment was given to the U.S.A. by the Province of Ontario that no tolls