

one, i.e. the guaranteeing of one's own security through the acquisition of additional military prowess. But confidence building need not be a unilateral process.

If states would undertake reciprocal measures that would lessen the opportunity to actually utilize military force as an instrument to pursue aggressive political objectives, one could begin to speak of the kind of confidence building that would be conducive to arms reductions."³⁴

Richard Darilek, in the summary of the discussion at a major conference on Confidence-Building Measures, made some interesting observations about Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) which suggest that they are *not* quite the same thing as CBMs.

"In view of such negative factors attendant upon their birth, it seemed highly encouraging ... that the subsequent history of CBMs ... had revealed a less narrow approach to the ultimate possibilities of CBMs, a broader conception of what they can and should be expected to do in the future, and even a new common denominator for encapsulating this broader conception, namely, the agreement at Madrid henceforth to entitle them *confidence and security building measures*. Thus, ... the history of CBMs had turned positively in the direction of improving their link to arms control and disarmament. With the addition of the possibility of more militarily restrictive measures inherent in the notion as well as the title of CBM, the first step in this direction had already been taken.

Other participants agreed that, to the extent CBMs included constraints on military activities, as CSBMs might, they were moving close to becoming actual arms control. ... [One scheme for distinguishing between the two] would class as a CBM any

measure that reduces threat perceptions (e.g. by demonstrating that they are wrong) or threat options (e.g. by restricting the use of existing forces). It would draw the line, however, and class as arms control any measure that would actually reduce military capabilities, e.g. by reducing military forces."³⁵

Henning Wegener's description of the key features of the CBMs is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it is an "official" view (that of the Federal Republic of Germany). Second, there was a deliberate effort made to produce a "flexible description of the key elements of a possible universal CBM approach."

"[C]onfidence-building measures are perceived as a specific category of state behavior relating to security and military matters, designed to provide credibility to affirmations of peaceful intentions. In order to create confidence successfully, CBMs must form a sustained pattern of action translated by measures of a militarily significant and adequately verifiable character. In order to enhance the belief of states in the absence of specific military threats emanating from a potential adversary and in the continued existence of its benevolent intentions, a large number of CBMs aim at providing more transparency and openness concerning one's own military posture. Other CBMs provide for restrictions on technically possible military options. All CBMs leave military forces and their existing composition intact."³⁶

In a comprehensive discussion of the CBM concept and its role in the United Nations policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Falk Bomsdorf distinguishes between a comprehen-

³⁴ Lynn Hansen, "Confidence Building in Europe: Problems and Perspectives," in Birnbaum, *Confidence Building in East-West Relations*, p. 53.

³⁵ Richard Darilek, "Summary of Discussions," in Karl Birnbaum, (ed.) *Confidence Building in East-West Relations*, p. 126.

³⁶ Henning Wegener, "Confidence-Building Measures: Europe and Beyond," in Larrabee and Stobbe, *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, p. 167.

