

define action in this way, he can do so. And if he chooses also to define freedom, so as to make it indicate merely the extent to which results follow our subjective exertions of energy, he can do so. But I repeat that this is not the freedom of which we are conscious, since it is only from experience that we learn to connect certain results with our exertions of energy. And I say still farther, that it is not the freedom which forms the basis of our responsibility. We feel ourselves, as true agents, to be responsible for what we do, for the energies which we direct towards certain ends ; equally responsible whether the ends be attained or not.

With these remarks on the first article of my thesis, which places freedom in the possession of a veritable power of voluntary action, I proceed to the second, in which voluntary action is considered as prompted by motive.

A preliminary verbal explanation must be here made. We have seen that Edwards distinguishes voluntary action from act of Will ; meaning, by the latter, the act of the mind whereby we choose anything ; and by the former, the effect consequent upon our choice. On the view which I have taken of action as a subjective energy, there is no distinction between act of Will and voluntary action. An act of Will *is* a voluntary action ; and there is no other kind of voluntary action. I act by willing. I bend my arm—in so far as I, the living being, do anything in the case—by willing to bend it. Hence, in speaking of motives, it is immaterial whether we say that they influence the Will, or that they prompt to action. The two statements are identical.

Can we then define the relation of motives to the Will, or to the conduct, more precisely than by simply saying that motives influence the choice, or that men act from motives ? I do not believe that we can. But, as you are aware, philosophers of both the schools whose views we have been examining are of a contrary opinion. On the one hand, Edwards us tells that the strongest motive determines the Will according to a law of necessity. On the other hand, his opponents hold that the mind, by whatever motives it may be solicited, possesses a self-determining power. It is my task to show, as I hope to be able to do, that a criticism of these conflicting theories leads to the conclusion that there is no truth held by the disputants on either side which is not sub-