

their influence. (See Review of External Affairs, March 31, p. 6-7.) This led to a revival of discussions of the principle of confederation among the expatriate governments. It also renewed Russian alarm.

General Sikorski made a point of asserting in a public address a few days after Mr. Churchill spoke that the idea of a bloc of federated states must never be allowed to become a tool of veiled imperialism. Its sole aim should be the welfare and prosperity of the federated states themselves. The particular confederation proposed by the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments, for instance, should present the western democracies with a suitable area for mutually advantageous economic and political cooperation and not serve merely as a guarantee of immunity for the U.S.S.R. against German attack.

Whether or not this effort at appeasement made any impression on Soviet minds, it was supposed that Mr. Berle's speech a week later did have a soothing effect. Mr. Berle assured all interested persons that there was no intention of building buffer states against Russia. Buffer states were a thing of the past, since air warfare meant their demolition in a few hours. But if Mr. Berle was reassuring, Mr. Eden raised fresh questions in Russian minds when he made a point of denying during his American visit that the United Kingdom Government favoured proposals lately offered by the London Times for imposing an Anglo-Soviet security system on the smaller nations of Europe. The New Statesman and Nation thought it a pity that Mr. Eden should have encouraged the Poles in this way to imagine that they would not have to adapt themselves to the realities of the European situation.

Soviet distrust of western intentions was in fact quite as marked as western distrust of the U.S.S.R. André Visson stated in the Herald Tribune that the Soviet Government was particularly stirred by public discussions of Catholic agrarian