

Plattsburg, it ultimately determined the American refusal to change any of the western frontiers or Indian reserves. Its significance in this sense was pointed out by Wellington and reluctantly admitted by the British ministers.

2. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES.—Procter's position at Amherstburg had been precarious before. It became intolerable now. His supplies were giving out. They could not be made good by land transport, even if they had been forthcoming; and the waterway was closed. He had nothing to do but retreat, and retreat as fast as he could. But he lingered, temporised, and was lost. Ten days after the battle he was still at Amherstburg. He had only 600 effectives left besides Tecumseh's Indians, who were steadily diminishing. Harrison started in pursuit, the mounted men going round by land to Detroit, where they arrived on the 30th. Meanwhile the American infantry had disembarked at Amherstburg on the 27th. Procter had left Sandwich only one day before. His boats, baggage, women, and children, all delayed him in his retreat up the Thames. On the 2nd of October Harrison followed him with 3500 men. The British movements were not only slow but undecided. Procter could not make up his mind whether to abandon everything possible and increase his pace or stand and fight at the first defensible position.

On the 4th Harrison closed up and took two guns and the rearguard of 150 men. On the fatal 5th Procter stood at bay with 1000 dispirited and worn-out men against Harrison's exultant 3000. His position was good. There was a swamp on his right and the Thames on his left. The Indians took post to the right front, where the cover was excellent and the ground bad for whites. The little force of 400 redcoats stood in the open, all except a few men who had gone to Moraviantown to protect the crossing there. Harrison threw back his left to face the Indians, brought up his