

By *Rule 1,067*, special bail may be put in and perfected "according to the established practice." Then by *Rule 1,220* the former practice of the Courts of Law and Equity and the Court of Appeal, relating to costs, so far as not inconsistent with the *Rules*, is continued. These references to the former practice are too numerous, and in not a few cases might have been avoided by the framing of rules embodying such parts of the former practice as are thought proper to be retained.

We are disposed to think the arrangement of the new *Rules* is decidedly faulty. Reference to the *Rules* would have been very much facilitated if they had been arranged more nearly in accordance with the ordinary sequence of proceedings in an action. The order of arrangement adopted by the framers of the *Rules*, is very difficult to reconcile with any proper method. For instance: *Rules 124-137*, governing the procedure in some particulars in the Master's office, are grouped together at the beginning of the *Rules* under the head of "Master's Office:" other rules on the like subject are found later, as *Rules 347-363*. Then, some of the *Rules* regulating payment of money into Court, and stop orders, are found under the head of "Accountant's Office" (*Rules 139-193*); and some way after these *Rules*, we come to the *Rules 224-249*, regulating the issue of writs for the commencement of actions; and then later on, under "Miscellaneous Proceedings," we find further *Rules 632-640*, relating to payment of money into Court. Not only is the arrangement of the *Rules* lacking in scientific method, but the printing of the official copy is indifferent, the paper of poor quality, and the number of typographical errors inexcusable.

Having said this much as to the framing of the *Rules*, and the manner in which they have been published, we will proceed to point out a few matters in which we think they might be improved. Some changes which have been made in the wording of *Rule 30*, which defines the jurisdiction of the Master in Chambers, appear to us to have been made without due consideration. In the first part of the *Rule* it is provided that the Master in Chambers is to exercise all such authority and jurisdiction in respect to all actions and matters, including proceedings in the nature of a *quo warranto*, "as by virtue of any statute or custom, or by the rules of practice," etc. are now exercised by any judge sitting in Chambers. In the sentence we have quoted the revisers of the *Rules* have incautiously substituted "of" for "or," which materially narrows the operation of the *Rule*. And in the concluding part of this *Rule*, among the matters excluded from the Master in Chambers' jurisdiction, is now included "staying proceedings after verdict or judgment." The words "or judgment," which have been added by the revisers of the *Rules*, were, no doubt, intended to refer only to cases where judgment had been pronounced by a judge in court, but the *Rule* as it stands excludes not only such cases, but also cases where judgment has been entered by default.

On referring to the schedule to the *Rules* we find *Chy. Ord. 610*, which provided for the issue of orders for the appointment of guardians *ad litem* to infants, on *procipe*, is set down as effete, and its provisions have consequently been omitted. This, we think, is a mistake, as the *Rules* do not sufficiently