

Table 6 indicates a plausible Soviet force structure with the modernisation which the Soviet proposal apparently permits. The most important aspect of the modernisation is to introduce the mobile, 10 warhead SS-24, and the mobile, single warhead SS-25. The consequence of this modernization is not to improve Soviet counterforce capability, for the mobile SS-24 is not likely to be more accurate than the SS-18, but to reduce the vulnerability of Soviet ICBMs. This is obtained in two ways: through mobility, and through introduction of the single warhead SS-25 which allows an increase in the number of launchers to be achieved within the 3600 warhead constraint. It might be noted, therefore, that, neither of these systems appear to pose a greater counter-force threat to the US than the pre-modernised force structure identified in Table 3.

In the plausible force structure identified above, the Soviets are also presumed to deploy the SS-N-23, a liquid fuelled, seven warhead SLBM which is more accurate than its predecessors but which is not thought to have a significant counter-force capability. They may or they may not choose, within the warhead and launcher totals, to modernize a relatively small bomber force.

E. American Central Strategic Forces After Specified Modernization

Table 7

<u>US Central Strategic Forces With Modernization</u>	
<u>Launcher Ceiling 998</u>	<u>Warhead Ceiling 6000</u>
50 MX (10 warheads)	500
198 Midgetman (1 warhead)	198
250 Minuteman (3 warheads)	750
Mark 12A	(1448) (24%)
216 Trident D-5 (8 warheads)	1728
128 Trident C-4 (8 warheads)	1024 (46%)
	(2752)
75 B-1 Bombers (24 warheads)	1800 (30%)
917	6000