

"Royal Marine or Canadian artillerymen, trained at the schools of gunnery.

"This force would serve as a nucleus and training school for the volunteers, could be profitably employed in the care of the several batteries, guns, stores, &c., and if a sufficient number of artificers, such as stone-masons, bricklayers, and carpenters, several of whom are generally found in the ranks of "A" and "B" batteries, were included in their number, the work of converting the present earthen batteries into defences of a more permanent character could be gradually carried on with considerable economy of expenditure."

The best means for the defence and development of British Columbia, our coal depôts, and the terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway would I believe be military colonization of the old Roman or modern Austrian type, which I hope to discuss more fully at the end of this paper.

Let us now consider our left flank.

Atlantic Seaboard.

The second common base of operations against Canada would be the Atlantic seaboard. It is needless to specify the numerous localities round which the struggle of old wars have surged, of which time does not alter the strategic conditions. Along that indented coast (which would still serve ourselves or our neighbours, whichever had the strongest hand uppermost to begin with), vessels like the "Cimbria" could still be fitted out as privateers against our commerce and the unprotected fishing towns of the Nova Scotian, New Brunswick, Prince Edward's Island, and Newfoundland coasts. After reading Mr. Brassey's figures, which tell us that Newfoundland alone in 1872 had 10,000 men engaged in the seal fishery, while the value of the fish exported from that island alone amounted to 1,340,000*l.*, one feels tempted to say if they suffer, the verdict will be, "serve them right." But we cannot allow such verdicts to go forth to the world, if there is any real Imperialism left among us. It is to be hoped the hitherto obdurate islanders, than whom Mr. Brassey says there are no subjects of the Crown more loyal or devoted, will round off our transatlantic Dominion by joining it.

Fortunately at Halifax we have retained some of the *ultima rationes regum et populorum*. We need not therefore discuss the defence of this fortress and harbour, which, however valuable in other senses, can in no sense be considered a safe base for operating in the inland defence of Canada, for the Treaty of 1842, which handed over the State of Maine, sends a wedge of territory up to within a few miles of the intercolonial railroad, which a handful of troopers could at any moment render unserviceable in a night, thus cutting off retreat to Halifax or succour from thence to the upper provinces. It is true that detachments were sent from Halifax during the Trent difficulty; but the United States were at that time disunited States. There are, unfortunately, other undefended points on the intercolonial railroad where the destruction of a bridge by the boat's crew of a privateer