for this Court to review the judgment, and determine whether it was warranted by the evidence, and secondly, that if it were competent for this Court to enquire into the matter, then that on this special verdict, it appears that, in fact, there was evidence on which the Court of Quarter Sessions were justified in acting. On the first point, the argument of Mr. Mellish has quite satisfied my mind that the defendants contention is right. It seems to me to be impossible to question that the Court of Quarter Sessions had competent jurisdiction, the Act of Will. 3, expressly gives it to them, but we are entitled to look to see if the complaint made against the relator amounts to a misdemeanour in his office, and I am very clearly of opinion that it does. I agree with Mr. Justice Willes that "if the justices were to make an order, which they thought right, and which the clerk of the peace, after remonstrance had failed to satisfy them it was wrong, still refused to act on, that would clearly amount to a misdemeanour." I agree also with the counsel for the relator that, if Mr. Wildes *bona fide* thought that the Court of Quarter Sessions were doing something illegal and unjustifiable, and if he entertained a belief that when their attention was called to it, the Court would rectify the error, it would be his duty to point out to the Court the mistake into which he supposed them to have fallen, and a mere delay or strong remonstrance would not amount to a misdemeanour. But if from the outset he determines that whether the Court agree with him or not he will not comply with their order, or when he perseveres in disobedience to it after he has brought the matter before them, then I agree with Mr. Justice Willes that the proper course being to leave it to the Queen's Bench to say whether the order was right, the clerk of the peace would be setting himself up as superior to the justices and master, and would be guilty of a misdemeanour. There was, therefore, in my opinion before the Court of Quarter Sessions, an offence charged, which, if proved, gave them authority to dismiss the relator. That charge was brought before the Court, in writing, as required by the Act of Will. III., and from what happened at that and the subsequent Courts as appears by the special verdict, I cannot doubt that there was evidence brought before the Court, and inquired into, going to the question whether there had been a misdemeanour on the part of the relator in his office. On this state of fact, and without expressing as yet any opinion as to whether the evidence warranted the Court in coming to the decision at which they arrived, there arises this question—whether it is open to this Court to inquire whether the Court of Quarter Sessions were warranted in coming to the conclusion at which they arrived. I am of opinien that it is not so open to us. The rule is well established in cases of summary convictions. As to everything which relates to jurisdiction this Court will interfere to regulate, and set right inferior tribunals, but when once we find that there is jurisdiction, this Court will not take upon themselves to say whether the decision actually arrived at, is that which this Court would have come to. It may be that something may happen in the course of a case which is inconsistent with what has been called natural, but what I prefer to call rational justice—such as the refusal to hear a party—and then this Court will interfere; but, unless something of the sort appears, we should not enter into the merits of the case. Applying this to the still stronger case of a Court of Quarter Sessions, which is a court of record, when we find—as we do here—that the charge is one over which the Court have jurisdiction, that the provisions of the statute have been complied with, and a written charge exhibited, that there has been proof in open court and an opportunity to the person charged to defend himself, and thereupon a decision—we cannot interfere because we may be dissatisfied with that decision, and should ourselves have arrived at a different one. This case is somewhat different from the one that was before the Court of Common Pleas, for that was an action for the fees of the office received by the defendant, and in that case the answer was that the claim could not be entertained, because the claimant was not in the office, and the court could not enter into the question whether his removal from it was right or wrong: the court could not go behind the judgment. But so here; unless we find that the Court of Quarter Sessions has proceeded wrongfully and illegally, we cannot go behind the judgment. If this court has any jurisdiction over such a court of record other than that I have pointed out, it would be, I think, by *certiorari*, but on this enquiry we cannot go into the question whether the relator has been properly removed on the evidence adduced before the court below.

I feel, however, bound to add that, after the most careful consideration that I can give to this case, I am myself satisfied that Mr. Wildes—for some motive which I will not enter into, whether of discharging his duty, or from angry feeling, or otherwise—did in fact refuse, and absolutely refuse, to obey the order of the court. The evidence satisfies me on this point, and that on this the contention of the defendant is also right. I think the conclusion from the evidence is fair, that he had made up his mind that the order was illegal, and that he would not enter it; that, in pursuance of this resolution, he did refuse, and that in this he committed a misdemeanor in h office. The conclusion, then, is, that the pleas are sufficient, and that our judgment should be for the defendant.

Hannen, J.—I have nothing to add, except to express my concurrence on both points. It is not competent to us to inquire into the grounds on which the Court of Quarter Sessions arrived at their decision, and I may further say that I entirely agree, if it were competent for us to inquire into the evidence, I myself should come to the same conclusion, that there was a refusal by Mr. Wildes which amounted to a misdemeanor in his office.

Hayes, J., concurred.