

at and the decision was that it would be an unwise arrangement to put into force for the reason that it would probably create in the minds of all the pilots concerned, both military and civil, a perfectly false sense of security.

There is no difficulty whatever with respect to having T.C.A. or any other commercial aircraft operating on the airway communicate with the control tower at those airports. There is, however, great difficulty in transmitting or relaying that information to the 30, perhaps 40 military aircraft which may be operating in the area. Some are operating on one radio frequency, and some are operating on another. Some are flying within range of the tower transmitter, and some are not. And if that message of the approach of a civil aircraft was relayed from the tower and the impression created that because that had been done, there would be no military aircraft found in the airway space constituting the airway, it would be entirely wrong. The decision taken at that time, not by T.C.A. was that it should not be done. Another instance in relation to that which I think is worthy of reporting is that with respect to Moose Jaw, for instance, T.C.A. is operating 12 flights a day in both directions past that station, which represents about 40 per cent of the total traffic on the airway. This means that there are something like 30 or 40 services operating past the station. To have a condition of alert existing for even 15 minutes with respect to each one of these aircraft would simply mean that the airway space would be permanently closed to military aircraft.

Mr. HAHN: Does C.P.A. advise them, do you know?

Mr. MCGREGOR: C.P.A. follows the exact rule which is observed by all airlines, that if it is approaching an airport at which it intends to land, it notifies the control tower of this intention. C.P.A. lands at Moose Jaw, and therefore they pass a message to that effect. If they do not intend to land at Moose Jaw they do not do it.

Mr. HAHN: The regulations where they do not land are similar to yours.

Mr. MCGREGOR: Yes.

Mr. HAHN: Another charge which was made was in connection with the elevation at which the planes flown by T.C.A. were to fly. If the T.C.A. planes maintained an altitude of 8,000 feet, I believe it would do much to overcome the accident risk, because the Harvards at this training school have a maximum altitude of only 6,000 feet, I believe.

Mr. MCGREGOR: Yes. I think there is a modicum of truth in that statement. While the Harvards can go higher than 6,500 feet, they do not normally operate at altitudes greater than this, and our aircraft are normally operated higher than 8,000 feet with respect to the west bound planes and 9,000 feet as a desired minimum with respect to east bound planes. But the reason why it is most unwise that there should be a required minimum altitude at which our aircraft can be operated on the airway is that, particularly on the prairies, it is frequently the case that the difference between 6,000 and 8,000 feet will mean the difference between flying in entirely safe conditions and flying in conditions of freezing rain, ice formation on the aircraft, turbulence due to thunder storm activity and so on. All aircraft operating on the airway under scheduled airline regulations file what is known as a flight plan, and in that flight plan the altitude at which the operation is going to take place is recorded and distributed over the traffic control ground circuits and that aircraft is not permitted to depart from that altitude without making a radio request for permission to so alter its altitude and receiving definite confirmation that that request has been acceded to.

Mr. HAHN: It might be better for safety, if our recommendation was that the R.C.A.F. should be asked to keep its aircraft at a lower level?