

While Canada is committed to a universal non-proliferation treaty, we by no means rule out the regional approach to non-proliferation. We therefore support and should like to encourage countries attempting to create nuclear free zones in areas relatively free from grave international tensions. The efforts of the Latin American and Caribbean countries in this regard deserve particular praise and we would also wish African countries success in their aspirations to make their continent a denuclearized zone.

Most countries, including the USA, and the USSR, advocate an end to nuclear testing underground to complete the agreement which was reached in Moscow to prohibit nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. The difficulty of course is over verifying that all parties to the treaty shall respect obligations not to carry out underground tests. The position of the USSR is that all underground tests anywhere can be detected by national means within national territories. The position of the USA and its western allies is that, although considerable improvements have been made in detecting underground tests by seismological and other scientific means, yet a certain number of underground events still cannot be identified as either earthquakes or nuclear explosions. That is to say that if verification of a treaty were limited to seismological means alone, there would still be a possibility of a nation evading its obligations by carrying out clandestine underground tests. The USA position is that a small number of inspections at sites of unidentified events is necessary in order to be sure that obligations would be adhered to.

As I have indicated, there has been continuing effort to improve techniques for detecting and identifying of underground events. Possibilities of supplementing them are being explored. Canada supports the proposal put forward for this purpose by Sweden, which is that interested countries, primarily those not nuclear powers, should exchange seismic information. The proposed exchanges would take place principally among those countries with a sufficiently advanced seismological science and data-gathering or processing equipment, but results would be available to all. With information coming from many sources, individual countries would be in a better position to assess whether any suspicious underground event was natural or nuclear in origin. We attach importance to the participation of the nuclear powers in the suggested exchange and welcome their expressed interest. If the USA and the USSR, for example, could provide information from sites close to indeterminate events to supplement information now available from distant monitoring, many more nuclear events could be identified.

It has also been suggested recently that the idea of so-called "black boxes", that is, sealed seismographic installations, could supplement distant means and would make it