

strongly argued that, even if there was absolutely no international trade in goods and services embodying components protected under intellectual property legislation, the U.S. would still be dissatisfied about what it views as the lack of adequate protection of intellectual protection under Canadian law. It should be noted that a similar argument could be made with regard to U.S. attitudes toward the intellectual property protection provided by a broad range of other countries, both developed and developing.

Given the above, the question arises as to why the U.S. would wish to raise intellectual property in negotiations intended to deal with trade in goods and services, as opposed to specialized intellectual property fora. The reason for this is related largely to U.S. dissatisfaction with these other fora and the associated need to find new avenues for encouraging other countries to provide stronger intellectual property protection. Discussions to revise the Paris Convention have reached an impasse after nearly two decades of negotiations, with the LOC's influence being a major factor. Furthermore, the Paris Convention provides no dispute settlement mechanism. Through the tying of intellectual property to negotiations such as the potential Canada/U.S. trade liberalization discussions or the upcoming round of the GATT, the U.S. can use their trade influence to full advantage.