and ships. Finally, on-board inspections would give final assurance that treaty limits on nuclear SLCMs were being observed.

This complex procedure undoubtedly reinforced the view, particularly strongly held by the US Navy, that verification procedures were too intrusive. Going into the Wyoming meeting, the United States was willing to discuss only a non-binding exchange of information on deployment plans. However, the Soviets made a significant change in their position. Without relinquishing their claim that SLCMs be controlled, they suggested that SLCMs be taken out of the START negotiation and be the subject of a separate but associated agreement. Shevardnadze also suggested that SLCMs might become part of a broader negotiation on naval arms control. Although the latter linkage is also unacceptable to the Bush Administration, which currently opposes any naval arms control negotiations, the shift in Soviet position appeared to clear the way for a compromise which would permit the START negotiation to conclude without an agreement on SLCMs.

AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

The Wyoming meeting was less successful in resolving another longstanding disagreement on the counting rule to be applied to air-launched cruise missiles. In the Soviet view, all ALCMs with a range of more than 600 kilometres should be included in the 6,000 warheads total. To calculate the numbers involved, each bomber would count as having the number of ALCMs which it was equipped to carry, with this to be confirmed by on-site inspections.

The United States has resisted this approach on a number of grounds. First, the 600-kilometre criterion would probably snare the SRAM II, a new stand-off airlaunched missile which has so far been exempt from the warhead ceiling insofar as it is treated in the same way as a gravity bomb. (A strategic bomber carrying gravity bombs counts as one delivery vehicle and one warhead no matter how many bombs and SRAMS it might carry). Second, the administration argues that heavy bombers would seldom if ever carry their maximum capable number of ALCMs, and so proposes instead a nominal counting rule of ten ALCMs per designated bomber. A standard counting rule of this kind, however, weighs unevenly on the two sides. The Soviet Bear-H and Blackjack bombers carry a maximum of twelve ALCMs each, whereas the B-52-H and the B-1B can carry twenty, or, in some accounts, even twenty-four ALCMs. Since both sides continued to accept the START rule that heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs would count as one delivery vehicle and one warhead under the proposed ceilings, the United States in particular continued to maintain a potential to deploy far more actual warheads than would be counted under the 6,000-warhead ceiling.

Although Wyoming failed to produce a solution to the ALCM question, the problem nevertheless seemed conducive to compromise in an eventual settlement of the outstanding issues. Unlike SLCMs, the ALCM issue is simplified by the relative ease of identifying the ALCM carrier, a procedure which worked successfully in SALT II. The question, therefore, centred more on the negotiation of an equitable formula rather than on verification as such.

VERIFICATION AND STABILITY

At Wyoming the two parties also signed an Umbrella Agreement on verification and stability. With some modifications, this agreement copied the series of proposals tabled by the United States in June 1989, when it was suggested that a package of verification measures could be agreed in advance of a specific treaty text. The measures covered in principle in the Umbrella Agreement were the following:

- An exchange of nuclear weapon data both before and after reductions take place. Recognizing the complexity involved in the data exchange, the advance exchange of data was presented as a way to facilitate the final treaty negotiations.
- 2) The trial monitoring of mobile missile factories. Under the INF Treaty, the two sides established portal monitoring of missile factories to ensure that no further missiles were produced. Since the START agreement would not ban the production of mobile missiles but only establish limits on production, monitoring promised to be considerably more demanding. Trial monitoring also addressed US concerns about the difficulties of verifying mobile missiles in storage rather than deployed.
- 3) Direct inspection of missile warheads or re-entry vehicles. This provision essentially permitted the sides to move away from the old principle that a missile would be deemed to have the maximum number of warheads with which it had been flight tested. The US proposal now permitted each party to stipulate the number of warheads deployed on a given missile such as the MX or the D-5, and to accept on-site inspection as a means of verifying compliance.
- 4) A ban on encoding telemetry from missile flights. The Reagan Administration had frequently alleged that Soviet encryption of missile test data violated SALT II. The proposal for a ban on encryption, however, failed to specify precisely what encryption