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Italy/Alessi

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OS

Another positive step would be the prompt communication to an international authority of the full orbital elements of every object launched into space and a more detailed description of its mission on the basis of a standardized reporting instrument. This would involve a modification of the 1974 United Nations Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. At present, parties to that Convention are free to provide whatever kind of information they wish on their launches, and in the format they wish. The result is that such information is too sketchy and difficult to compare.

Co-operative measures to permit ready verification of orbit and general function could also be envisaged on the basis of article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, which calls for prior consultations on activities that would "cause potentially harmful interference with the activities of other States Parties".

The 1974 Registration Convention provides also, at least in part, a basis for the identification of interest in a space object. The elaboration of a detailed set of principles or circumstances which would identify a space object as one covered by a future arms control agreement would also be of primary importance.

The question of ownership, control, or other elements of interest in and responsibility for a space object is a delicate question to be solved with priority in the appropriate forum, in particular at a time when joint space ventures, including commercial ventures, are becoming more and more numerous.

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FRG/Wegener

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CW

The main purpose of my intervention today is to introduce Working Paper CD/518 that records the results of the recent Workshop on the Verification of the Destruction of Stocks of Chemical Weapons organized by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in Munster, Lower Saxony. The Workshop, to which member and observer delegations of the Conference on Disarmament were invited was intended to acquaint these delegations with the procedures used by one of the few existing destruction facilities of chemical weapons, and to provide a forum for discussion of all aspects relating to the destruction of such weaponry. The destruction facility in Munster undertakes to eliminate old stocks of chemical weapons that were found after World Wars I and II. The Federal Government had chosen to devote its 1984 Workshop to the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons because it holds the view that the destruction of stocks deserves a particularly high priority in the negotiations on a future chemical-weapons ban. The current threat emanates in the first instance from existing chemical weapons stockpiles. Furthermore, the Federal Government considers the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks to be a key problem of the entire verification complex of a future chemical weapons convention. If it proves possible to reach agreement on the verification issue, it should also be possible to agree on the necessary inspections for the other areas of the convention.

The Federal Government draws the following conclusions from the Workshop in Munster:

Firstly, the requirement of effective verification of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons can be met only with a monitoring system operating on a continuous basis;

Secondly, a continuous monitoring system should comprise a mutually complementary combination of checks by inspectors and monitoring by tamper-proof measuring devices;

Thirdly, the integration of technical monitoring devices should aim at reducing the number of inspectors required to be present at all times, thus diminishing the degree of