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The Volunteer Review,

AND

MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, JULY 15, 1873.

To CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as Communications intended for publication, must, invariably, be *pre-paid*. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and in the corner the words "Printer's copy" written; and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage.

We give our readers the following article from the *Frontier News* entitled the "Volunteers and Montrealers" for the purpose of shewing how thoroughly the spirit of opposition to the development of the military power of Canada, is manifested by the commercial classes, while it is abundantly evident, that their interests is the first to suffer directly from the effects of political disturbances, which the country would be unprepared to encounter, and also to demonstrate that this feeling is well understood, and appreciated by the agricultural classes who have, in reality, the greatest aggregate interest in the defence of Canada, and its thorough preparedness for any contingency that might arise.

We did not hesitate to fix the quarter whence the mischievous and absurd cry for

economy which has crippled military training for one year at least, came. And we do not hesitate to say now that it was and is a monstrous error to suppose that yielding to such a cry would be a popular act or even be well received by the people of the country who understand distinctly that they have no safety except in constant vigilance and stern preparation.

It is evident that the time has arrived to make all the great commercial centres undertake their own defence, by embodying every man capable of serving, making the duty compulsory, and local drill at stated periods imperative. The traders cry for economy, can be gratified by allowing no pay and compelling the municipality to clothe and arm their own soldiers; thus every city would have its own garrison, while the active army for field operations could be drawn from the rural districts by voluntary service as at present, for which they should be paid the full value of their time.

An arrangement of this description would accomplish the great work of making the commercial class bear the full share of military duty, take their proper place in defence of their own interests, have a force always at hand in aid of the civic police, and would insure that order, in Montreal and other cities which their municipal government at present fail to maintain; there would always be efficient garrisons to prevent such centres being surprised, and as the *strategy of invasion*, as far as Canada is concerned, must be met by an army in the field, it would at once relieve the country of the cost of maintaining expensive garrisons in time of war. Those are considerations for the political economist, and our contemporary is right in stating that the volunteer force is not yet killed, although we believe we need not thank the Montrealers that such is not the case.

"Up to within a few months past it was a favourite cry of Montrealers—often of many who professed to be devoted Ministerialists—that the unpopular course and indifference of the then Minister of Militia, (the late Sir George Cartier) had killed the volunteer movement. We never put much faith in these stories, as we always surmised that a certain class of the community, whose patriotism scarcely extended beyond their own shop-fronts, were striving to shove upon others a responsibility which rightfully belonged to themselves, but any doubts we may have entertained have been set at rest during the last week. The reports of the volunteer gatherings at Havlock, St. Armand and Knowlton, conclusively show that the volunteer movement is not dead, in this military district at least. The men who never had any special favors shown them by the Government, and are now poorly supplied with clothing, are as ready as ever to turn out when called upon, whether it be for a jubilee, a rifle match or for more serious business. The simple truth is, if the volunteer movement be dead in Montreal its demise must be attributed to the hostility of one part of the people and the indifference of the other,

and not to the action nor want of action on the part of the late Minister. We are not prepared to say that the maintenance of the militia upon its former footing is either necessary or expedient; and whether or not Montreal ought to furnish any volunteers at all in times of peace we shall not stop to enquire—our simple desire is to point out that the onus for this altered state of things has not been fairly represented."

This first great principle of the Art of War is *strategy*, and it involves the following conditions:—

1st. The selection of the theatre of operation and the different contingencies consequent thereon.

2nd. The determination of the decisive points.

3rd. The Selection of a fixed base of operations.

4th. The selection of the objective point for offence or defence.

5th. The strategic points, lines of defence and fronts of operation.

6th. The choice of lines of operation.

7th. For given operations the best strategic lines with details of provisions for contingencies.

9th. The marches of armies considered as manoeuvres.

10th. The distribution of depots.

11th. Fortresses regarded as strategic means, as defences and as obstacles.

12th. Points for entrenched camps and works, covering passage of rivers, defiles, &c.

13th. The divisions to be made and the large detachments necessary.

It is also divided into offensive and defensive, or more correctly *the strategy of invasion*, and that of *defence*, as applied in modern warfare it comprehends all operations by land or sea, undertaken for offensive or defensive purposes, and is by far the most important study to which the statesman or soldier can direct his attention, because on a thorough appreciation of all its bearings and the provisions necessary to meet all its contingencies depends the safety as well as the existence of States.

There can be very little doubt that the neglect of this science by the disciples of the Utilitarian School has led to grave disasters, not only in a military point of view but politically and commercially; to it is to be traced the periodical recurrence of those panics, which have in a marked manner distinguished the social and commercial policy of Great Britain during the present century, has led to incalculable waste of national resources, and the misapplication of its great mechanical and man power, in attempts to provide for contingencies which could by no possibility occur, and when to this is added the contempt into which her foreign political relations have been brought by the ignorance which forced her statesmen to grope in the dark for remedies against imaginary evils, it can with great force be asserted that