

the necessity of providing means for their security and of increasing their naval resources.

2. That a commission properly constituted on an Imperial basis, should be appointed to inquire into this matter, and that such a commission might determine the just limits between Imperial and colonial responsibilities in the question of defence: and that thus might be prepared the way for a federation of the war forces of the Empire for purposes of defence.

3. That an absolute and pressing necessity exists for the erection of a great Imperial dockyard at the other side of the world, which would relieve the pressure on home dockyards and fulfil duties they cannot in war perform, and in peace offer commercial advantages of construction and repairs to ships of the mercantile marine.

4. That some change appears necessary in the administration of our war forces, because as the protection of Imperial roads is partly naval and partly military, there is no one controlling power over both; the Admiralty may scatter fleets in one direction, the War Office tie up military forces in another, but there is no power to combine the two, and without such combination each branch of our war power of defence would be helpless.

5. That as the communications of the Empire are the common property of all its compound parts, each portion, according to the use it makes of them, has a direct interest in their defence, and should contribute to that object.

Lastly, "That forces created for the defence of "homo" must "survey the Empire," in order to behold that which they are to defend.

Before, however proceeding further I will give two passages from that remarkable paper, "Fallacies of Federation," which must be taken in conjunction with what I have already quoted. "It must be borne in mind," says Mr. Forster, "that so long as any colonies are British colonies the British Government is bound to protect them and would protect them in case of war . . . and Great Britain is also bound to bear, and could not avoid bearing the chief cost of such war." Taking this last passage in connection with the general statements of the address from which it is extracted, I conclude the chief cost means the whole cost, less only the expense of such local and purely defensive works the colonies choose to create or maintain. Any colony may or may not provide means of defence. The British Government cannot, in an Imperial sense, compel it to do so, nor exercise control over the constitution or distribution of such local forces or means of defence,—if created,—beyond colonial limits. The fact of a colony not adopting of its own free discretion means of defence adequate to its requirements, or to the best of its ability, simply increases the responsibility of the British Government. The responsibility, therefore, of the Government at home in the matter of defence becomes greater in exact proportion as a sense of responsibility on the part of the colony diminishes. The less a colony does, the more must the United Kingdom do. Now this is not a matter merely between an apathetic colony and the mother country, but it affects every portion of the Empire, because the extra war power necessary to put forward for the safety of that colony is just so much deducted from the force available for the protection of other Imperial fragments.

The question to be first settled is this: What is protection? What is defence? It is really only chasing shadows to devise schemes for the protection of our colonies; it is only a dreamer's fancy to arm for defence and to emblazon flags with "Self-reliance," if we are not clear what it is we have to protect what it is we have to defend. Are we going to protect the unity of the Empire, or merely to prepare to save what we can out of a possible wreck? Are the strong to defend themselves and

let the weak perish? Are Englishmen behind "increased and stronger harbors and coast defences" at Sydney to regard with complacency the capture of Fiji; to hear without dismay the capture of King George's Sound; or that the foe had established a base of operations at New Guinea, or in still more suitable positions on some of the neighboring islands? I feel certain the able writer of the article would in the presence of such contingencies be inclined to think that the honor, wealth, and supremacy of magnificent Sydney was concerned "first and principally," and that so long as Sydney could spare a single man or had a single shilling available to help to prevent such a catastrophe she would not have done her duty did she not spend that shilling and dispatch that man. I rather fancy that the writer now so strongly in favor of rooting all military power of defence to the particular soil on which it is raised, would then fling away his pen and carry a sword across the sea for the safety and honor of that Sydney he so dearly loves.

I do not ask for "standing armies in the colonies." I only submitted that the several parts of the Empire should come to a common understanding as to the defence of the Imperial strategic points, such, for example, as Fiji and King George's Sound, and in proportion to the extent to which their honor and wealth is concerned in the security and efficiency of those positions, so should they contribute in common with the mother-country to their maintenance and safety as Imperial strongholds.

If the colonies think it wholly and solely the duty of the people resident in the United Kingdom to provide for the safe-keeping of these Imperial keys, they should insist that they do it; they should not allow measures vital to their own safety to be so completely neglected. There is no use concealing the fact that the British Government, labouring under the pressure of home constituencies possessing all the power, cannot be reasonably expected to move far in such a matter except supported by counter-pressure from without. It is idle to forget that if cavalry and field artillery be deducted from the strength of the regular army—our only movable force—the number remaining would not provide the strategic points of the Empire with garrisons, much less furnish expeditionary forces, which the colonies imagine we can at any moment "throw on any shore." The Imperial roads cannot be kept open unless such places are secured independently of the protection of sea-going fleets, and therefore if the mother-country and her colonies do not come to some common and really Imperial understanding as to how these places are to be provided with sufficient garrisons, adequate defences, and naval resources, a great war will find our fleets helplessly watching their bases, while home and colonial merchant ships are being chased over the ocean like hares by *Alabama* greyhounds.

The problem of Imperial security cannot be solved by disintegrating that which is common to all, it is a burden resting proportionately on every fragment of the Empire, and distinctions are not those of responsibility, but simply of practical ability.*

The weak must bear their burden according to their strength. The problem is one, not of division, but of adjustment. The misfortune is that Imperial policy has been directed, not towards adjusting the burden, but has really thrown it down, leaving the United Kingdom and the colonies to cut off bits here and there according to

*AUSTRALIA.—"But while we have no control over any diplomacy, no power to say about the Eastern question, or any other question, no power to determine whether we shall go to war or remain at peace, there is no political reason for asking us to defray the cost of a war in which we have no voice, and perhaps no interest. There is nothing in this view of the case that is selfish; it is simply a corollary from the admitted doctrine that taxation and representation go together."—*Sydney Morning Herald*, August 3rd, 1877.