

of carrying
ic affairs, a
to Anglo-
se lead us to
and attitude
to other na-
ever-tighten-
mutual pro-
pon come—in
e life of the
ur has come—
be made one
eparate and

STATE FOR POSALS.

first duty of
ure that the
al power is
y is to assist
ion for the
r great Eu-
rces of our
t is not to
man of any
d dare to
—if we wera
efence. Wa
ar in mind
face of tha
ur flag and
vide differ-
n render
y to be in-
a foreign
n to sudden
the seat of
our distant
e of para-
easy to see
ere of dou-
ent, would
ry portion
k, and we
our land
nations,
bly great-
any other
must have
ell trained
es not ne-
efence of
clers, but
t's notice
efence of
ire whose
reatened.
as proved

that there is a solidarity of interests binding the different parts of the Empire into one bond. If all our forces were united into a reasonable and powerful organization, it would be a happy thing for the British Empire and a happy thing for the peace of the world. I have shown that the voluntary system which has been in force in the past, and on which the present Secretary of State now continues to depend, is quite inadequate for possible exigencies. The inter-dependence of the Regular Army and the Militia, one intended for service abroad, the other for defence at home, and both strictly limited in the number of effective men, is wrong in principle and untrustworthy in practice. The changes sketched by the Secretary of State for War in his late announcement, are undoubtedly an improvement on the present state. He gives three army corps of the Regular Army at Aldershot, Salisbury Plain, and Colchester respectively, and three other army corps for Militia and Volunteers at York, one in Scotland, the third in Ireland. Should the whole three army corps of Regulars become necessary in the operations of war abroad, it is quite certain that the other army corps of Militia and Volunteers will be called upon to strengthen the forces in the field. This result is as certain as that the sun rises, and once more will we see the Home Defences weakened at the very time when danger will be most imminent. When the best of the Militia are removed from their own ranks and till the thinned battalions in the field, it will become once more necessary to pick up the weak immature recruit and feed him and teach him at the moment that our enemy will be most likely to be knocking at our gates. Mr. Brodrick also proposes to raise eight British and five Indian battalions for garrison duty: that is good, but it does not meet the difficulties which are pointed out: indeed, it makes it so far the more difficult that we will have to find the reserves for the eight additional British battalions, if they are seriously engaged, and suffer loss by battle or disease. Mr. Brodrick also proposes to give additional pay of 4d. to the soldier who has completed Army, Color or Reserve service, for joining the Militia Reserve. That also is good, but is still inadequate for a full measure of defence. The best part of Mr. Bro-

rick's scheme is the proposal to raise 15 field artillery and 40 heavy batteries of Volunteers. All this is excellent, but the scheme does not in the very least come up to what will be necessary should he become involved in a war such as that in which we are still engaged, unless of course we are prepared to risk the safety of our Home defences in much the same way as we did in 1900 and 1901. Let us examine the case as it will be if Mr. Brodrick's measures are accepted.

Our Home forces are estimated to be:

Regulars	155,000
Reserve	90,000
Militia	150,000
Yeomanry	35,000
Volunteers	250,000
Total	680,000

Of the 155,000 Regulars we may count upon 35,000 as being under 21 years of age, short of establishment, sick or deserters, leaving 120,000 men available; of the Reserve we may count upon 80,000, giving a total of 200,000. Now, considering that we have had over that number in South Africa for the last two years, it shows that in a war of no greater dimensions than what is taking place there, we would at once have to fall back upon our Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers; that is, we must weaken the very inadequate force which we have for the necessary defence of our shores. I accept the numbers given for our Militia (150,000), Yeomanry (35,000), and Volunteers (250,000) without for one moment believing that more than one-half would be found available, if we judge by the past. With our best endeavors, we know and feel that the equipment, training, and organization of the one-half left will be such that they ought not to be thrust against an equal numerical force of highly-trained regular troops, if such should be landed for the invasion of England. When we consider the certainty with which an army can be concentrated, the facilities now available for the transportation of troops, the rapidity with which transports can move, and the complications which may attend concentration when a combination of hostile enemies is directed against us, it seems madness to entrust the safety of our Island to a less force than 250,000. And these should be