

the government. Apparently no conclusive evidence has yet been presented to substantiate this charge.

3. Sr. Donoso recalled that the former Cuban Ambassador in Santiago had been financing extreme left groups in Chile. His indiscretions had finally compelled the Chilean authorities to suggest to him that he should leave the country. However, he had not been declared *persona non grata* and diplomatic relations were maintained. Argémet had been requested by the Cuban Government for Mr. Stolik, (the Cuban Foreign Minister's young protégé who left Ottawa last December to become Chargé d'Affaires in London) but had been refused, and no other name had been submitted yet.

4. Sr. Donoso thought that the best way to deal with Castro was to leave him alone. He was facing serious economic trouble and the Soviet Union could not be expected to go on supporting him. Eastern European technicians and advisers found it increasingly difficult to co-operate with the excitable Cubans. The Soviet Union was able to dominate neighbouring countries, but it was the first time it had tried to extend its rule to a distant tropical island, and it is doubtful that Cuba could fit into the disciplined Communist bloc. Sr. Donoso said that Chile remained opposed to any attempt at collective action on the part of the Organization of American States. He felt that this opinion was shared by all Latin American States, with the exception of the 7 republics which had already broken off relations with Cuba.

5. Contrasting the performance of the Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, at the General Assembly with that of Ché Guevara at the Punta del Este Conference, he ascribed the difference in approach to differences in temperament.²³ Roa was an emotional "tropical" and, as a former opponent of Communism, was probably impelled to overstate his case in the manner of recent converts. Guevara, on the other hand, was a cold-blooded Argentine, clever and dangerous. Moreover, it suited Soviet interests to have Cuba remain within the Latin American family, and Guevara had simply been carrying out instructions by adopting a conciliatory attitude in Uruguay.

6. Sr. Donoso said that he was happy to co-operate in the United Nations with Mr. Tremblay, whom he praised as an excellent ambassador to Chile.

N.A. R[OBERTSON]

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*L'ambassadeur au Cuba
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in Cuba
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH NO. D-574

Havana, November 1, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SOVIET ORIENTATION OF CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY

During 1961 Cuba's foreign policy has become more and more aligned with that of the Soviet bloc to the point where, in effect if not in reality, Cuba has assumed the status of a Russian satellite in the international arena. In attempting to account for this development and

²³ Voir/See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1997), documents 257, 258.