

being made to set up a separatist pro-communist government, and where at the same time UAR troops technically withdrawn from the United Nations command still remain.

3. On the other hand, we find some merit in the Belgian case as set forth by Ambassador Rothschild. Leaving aside the legal aspect of the question, we find that on political grounds there is much to be said in favour of the middle-of-the-road course of action taken by the Belgians. It seems difficult to see how they could have done otherwise. Had the Belgians not met half-way the Congolese request, their action could have had serious consequences on their relations with the present United Nations-recognized Congolese Government and it is not unlikely that the morale of Colonel Mobutu's troops would have been adversely affected. This is a risk which the Belgians could hardly afford. We think that they have not gone too far either way: they have not prevented Mobutu's troops from crossing the Ruanda-Urundi, but they have not given them all assistance they could have given in other circumstances.

4. In fact we are of the opinion that this incident raises the broader problem of Belgium's relations with the Congo as a whole. Not to mention its economic aspects, the basic problem is a long, close and mutually profitable association with the Congo which the Belgians do not consider desirable to break up completely. We do not see either the necessity of a complete break up even though the Belgians may have made serious mistakes since last July. On the other hand, while there seems to be little doubt that the Belgians are better suited than anyone else to provide the assistance needed by the newly independent Congo, the Soviet Bloc, some Arab and Asian countries, certain quarters in the United Nations, as well as a number of more extremist Congolese are bent on getting all the Belgians out of the Congo and on breaking up all links between the two countries. The purposes of these manoeuvres are obvious. Still there remains a majority of Congolese who would wish to retain Belgian assistance, though, of course, on a different basis than before independence. It seems that in the face of all this, the Belgians have come to consider that the Congo has now definitely become part and parcel of the East-West struggle. Hence Western-minded Congolese leaders like Kasavubu, Tshombe and Mobutu, who are friendly towards Belgium, are given all the support and assistance they need. In view of Belgium's special position in the Congo and of the state of its relations with Lumumba, we think that there is some justification in this policy, until at least a Congolese leaders' round-table conference has settled some of the outstanding problems. After all, there is no evidence that the suppression of the Belgian "presence" in the Congo would be any guarantee against Soviet, communist or Arab penetration.

5. What worsens the situation in our opinion are the strained relations between the United Nations and Belgium on the Congo, particularly with regard to assistance. This provides the communists and the Arabs with welcome opportunities to brew storms in tea cups. Until a *modus vivendi* between the United Nations and Belgium is reached, there will not be much room for improvement. It is not irrelevant to note in this connection that ever since September 20, 1960,³ the Belgians have made serious efforts to reach agreement with the United Nations on this question. The United Nations have not been able to be nearly as forthcoming.

6. In view of the foregoing, the reasons not to respond to the Belgian request do not appear as obvious to this Division as they do to African and Middle Eastern Division. I might add in this respect that we fully concur with the comments made by Defence Liaison I Division in their memorandum of January 16 to you on the nature of the Belgian request for NATO support.

HENRY DAVIS

³ Voir/See "Belgium's Notes to U.N.," *New York Times*, September 11, 1960, p. 2.