

countryside of the world, the developing world—surrounding the cities of the world and overwhelming them, the cities being North America and Western Europe—this is pretty disturbing, but if you read it in context it makes quite clear, and this is very consistent with Mao's thinking, that wars of national liberation or revolutions succeed primarily and fundamentally through the efforts of the people in their own country and the friendly countries, like China, can supply only peripheral assistance, and this assistance is never decisive. In fact, some very reputable American Sinologists, specifically the Rand Corporation, have interpreted this whole document, which was called by their own American leaders, "the blueprint for Chinese aggression", as a specific warning to the Viet Cong to downgrade their activities because they were upgrading them too fast and getting into trouble. That is an extreme viewpoint the other way, though, that I do not accept, but that is closer to the truth, I think, than the hysterical reaction the document aroused in Washington.

Mr. WALKER: There was a phrase you used in reply to the question that I did not quite get. You said that this outside peripheral assistance is never decisive?

Mr. TAYLOR: It is never decisive; I cannot quote exactly, but the document is available to anybody who wants to read it in English, but the burden of what they said is that the wars of national liberation can only succeed primarily through the efforts of the people of that country.

Mr. FAULKNER: In that sense, then, would it be fair to say or to speculate that possibly the Chinese objectives or interests in terms of the war in Viet Nam would be an American withdrawal rather than, necessarily, an American military defeat in Viet Nam?

Mr. TAYLOR: I do not know. They have many things involved for them in Viet Nam. I think they want to see the Americans defeated and humiliated. They would settle for less, but I think that is what, ideally, they would like to see. They would like to see an American withdrawal under the most humiliating conditions, but they are practical men. I think they see several ways of the situation developing in a way that, to them, would be favourable; in other words, stronger military action by the Viet Cong eventually and/or rising public opinion in the United States about which they have some very misguided notions, I think. I think they see it possibly happening as a combination of all these factors.

Mr. FAULKNER: In other words, the inability, for instance, of mediators such as Canada, U Thant and others from Great Britain to bring the two sides to a negotiating position may, in some measure, be due to the fact that possibly both the North Vietnamese, for ideological reasons and, in turn, through them the Viet Cong—assuming there is some connection—and particularly the Chinese, are interested in a military defeat of the United States rather than just ending the war and having them withdraw gracefully and with some semblance of dignity?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think there is, at least, the possibility of a significant difference in how Hanoi sees the war and how Peking sees it. I also think there is a significant difference between the National Liberation Front of the Viet Cong and Hanoi but that is a much more controversial and contentious matter, but I think there is, obviously, a difference between Peking and Hanoi. They have different motives in the war. Some of their motives coincide but others do not.