

no encouragement, but meet only opposition on both the official and the non-official level from the outside world, an opposition which would result in the isolation of the State itself from any international assistance or support.

It is in this shadow of the past and the present, of fear on both sides, that we have to consider the problem which is immediately before us. As I see it, that problem is one of securing a firm and agreed basis for the withdrawal of Israel from those places which she still occupies beyond the armistice demarcation line; a basis which can be used to increase security and create conditions conducive to peace. If we do not secure such a basis, we may fail completely to bring about this withdrawal - with consequences which will be tragic for us all, and perhaps especially for Israel. As I have said before in this Assembly, it is not a question of rewarding or punishing; of laying down conditions or refusing conditions; it is a question of associating the withdrawal of Israel with arrangements which should remove the necessity, or at least minimize the possibility, of facing this same problem a year or two years from now.

From the very beginning of this crisis, the Canadian Delegation have tried to keep in the forefront of its thinking on this question the importance of finding a solution not merely for the problem posed by military intervention, but of that posed by the conditions that brought about the intervention.

It was in that spirit that we advocated the establishment of UNEF. We felt that by its action in bringing about an end of fighting, the Assembly was accepting responsibility for pursuing two related aims: the immediate aim of supervising and securing the cease-fire, and the longer-range objective of helping to create conditions in which it might be possible eventually to settle fundamental problems. We have insisted, even in the earliest days of this crisis, that a return to stability would not flow merely from words or acts of condemnation; that punishment was not a substitute for progress.

Now, more than three months later, we are confronted with the need to strike a similar balance between the immediate and primary objective of securing the completion of Israel's withdrawal; and that of achieving this in such a way that withdrawal will be accompanied by helpful and fruitful results. I repeat that we refuse to consider these as unrelated objectives, even though priority in time must be given to the first, withdrawal. We still require to believe that they cannot be achieved without adopting proposals for forms of pressure which would be an admission by the Assembly of complete and final failure to solve this problem constructively. Our Delegation does not believe that we should yet admit any such failure. We think that there is still a way of bringing about withdrawal by spelling out the detailed arrangements which would follow, and which would strengthen security and prepare the way for pacification. In its resolution 461 of February 2, the Assembly indicated in general terms the necessity for such arrangements. We should