

and difficult -- for any state to avoid disclosing all its arms and means of waging war. The Soviet proposals describe how an international control organ, provided it did not interfere in the domestic affairs of states (an almost impossible condition), would be empowered to remain permanently at certain key points which it would specify (such as atomic enterprises) in order to verify the observance by Governments of their obligations under the disarmament convention. However, how is an international control organ to know that everything has been disclosed? How is an international control organ to keep itself up to date and to discover violations of the agreement in parts of the country to which it has not been given access because the Government concerned says there is nothing there affected by the disarmament agreement? Surely this is asking us to trust the unsupported declaration of a Government in much the same way as we are asked to accept an uncontrollable prohibition of use.

"The Soviet representative tells us, as his predecessors have since 1947, that the control organ would have the right to make special investigations in cases in which it had specific grounds for suspecting a violation. I take it that the inspectors could then apply to the Government to visit town 'X', where there was alleged to be an undisclosed armaments factory. In due time under the Soviet scheme the Government would permit the officials of the international control organ to visit town 'X', accompanied and shepherded by Government officials of the state concerned -- and they would see what the Government wanted them to see.

"Without labouring the point further, I simply do not see how, under the Soviet system of control as so far revealed to us, we could be sure of having at least forewarning of any violations or evasions of any consequence. To my mind the warning is of the essence of any effective system of safeguards. It is perhaps even more important than the machinery for dealing with violations, although in this respect I also regard the Soviet proposals as completely inadequate since they would not give effective powers to the international control organ, nor would they provide for a veto-free decision on the international control organ's report in the Security Council.

"In brief," Mr. Robertson concluded, "it seems to me important that officials of the international control organ be empowered to pursue their investigations anywhere at any time within the boundaries of every state covered by the agreement, with no 'by your leave' and with complete freedom of movement, including freedom of movement by air."

The Soviet position on inspection has not changed. The Soviets have yet to clarify their formula that they are ready to accept inspection "on a continuing basis without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States". As every one of us is aware, there is as yet no international agreement on the interpretation to be placed on reservations concerning domestic affairs. I think it is altogether legitimate for the free world to know exactly what is the significance of this reservation so far as it is related to the carrying out of a disarmament programme.