

into an alliance chain of command to provide an essential link between national and international defence-policy planning, a link that may be supplemented but cannot be replaced by an allied commander. Therefore, planning for any coalition that may use armed forces in any manner must involve, from the very beginning, chiefs of defence and must then pay attention to their technical advice.

***Command Relationships*** Military authority, as Richard Leighton has described it, is "a kind of reserve power" and although it may not often be used, national military leaders and their subordinates know that it can be applied to compel obedience. Military leaders of coalition forces composed of sovereign states have never held the same kind of reserve power or final authority as have national military leaders. Command relationships and the authority given to coalition commanders are usually constrained by the notion that national defence and the responsibility for the employment and safety of national armed forces are the inalienable province of national leaders.

Thus, coalition operations commanders never receive unfettered command of national armed forces and their authority is limited in important ways. They have no power to discipline national forces or even individuals placed under their command, but must defer to national leaders and procedures. Commanders have power of command only over troops that nations agree to provide to them, for limited periods, and for specific operations. Finally, coalitions usually impose general prohibitions against reorganizing national forces or assigning them missions separate from their parent units, or to new regions without national authority. National civil authorities may make exceptions to these rules in emergencies, where national contributions are small, or when allied units are organized, for symbolic reasons, into international formations.

***Logistics and Operations*** Coalition commanders exercise little control over the logistical support they need to conduct operations. This separation between logistics and operations challenges military doctrine, but in coalitions, equipping and supplying forces is a national responsibility independent of commanders for reasons that have little to do with war and everything to do with national sovereignty, economics, and politics. Commanders and their staffs may determine desirable stock levels for each contingency plan, they may set "standards," usage rates, and so on, but a response to those demands depends on political decisions that can only be taken in capitals. This norm places significant responsibilities on national political and military authorities to ensure that forces, including government-sponsored civilians and NGOs, are adequately prepared in very sense for the missions they undertake and to critically assess promises from other states to meet national needs.

This seemingly simple regime has a universal appeal and provides NATO and the United Nations with a framework to build effective, operational forces for crisis and wartime. Few traditional allies would be surprised at this schematic for coalition politics, but new allies and passing partners might find it odd. Nevertheless, Canadian officers and officials might benefit from careful consideration of these principles, norms, and rules and the consequences they inevitably impose on policymakers, international commanders, and states. Though some might wish to escape these impositions, they are drawn from a long history of liberal democracies in partnership and this fact makes them very difficult to avoid.