

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

confidence in the system and in other States parties; still, we are of the opinion that confidence must be the result of verification and not the alternative to it.

The inspection of facilities producing schedule 3 chemicals could also be a step forward in a related field, namely the problem of schedules and guidelines. We are impressed by the efforts of the technical experts to find an optimum solution, though some of the argumentation concerning the placement of certain chemicals seems to be a bit too pragmatic. It certainly appears to cause fewer practical problems to put in schedule 2 chemicals of which the annual production is only a few tons, rather than others whose annual production can only be measured in thousands of tons. Nevertheless, the only criterion to govern putting a specific chemical in schedule 2 or 3 should be the degree of danger it poses to the basic goals of the convention. One can easily come to the conclusion that the real risk lies in higher rather than lower quantities of production. If, however, all facilities producing schedule 2 or schedule 3 chemicals face in one way or other the possibility of being inspected - and why not go back here to the idea of an ad hoc basis? - the risk is at least decreased.

The ability to disclose potential non-compliance is only one element of credible deterrence. The other factor is constituted by sanctions - sanctions against those States which do not abide by their voluntarily assumed international obligations. Hungary is ready to support the strictest possible regime of sanctions against violators of this convention. In this regard, special consideration should be given to cases of the use of chemical weapons, since this is practically the only form of violation which can be proved with almost total certainty.

Speaking about sanctions, obligations and verification, one cannot avoid the problem of universality and - in close connection to it - the still outstanding issues of article XI. Our endeavours to find a solution perhaps require a twofold approach. On the one hand, States remaining outside the convention should be urged to join. It is justified by the security interests of the whole international community that, after a reasonable period of time, the ways and means of persuasion should not only be political but economic as well. The convention should include carefully worded but concrete provisions guiding our future activities in this field. On the other hand, all States have to see clearly and be able to judge their situation even before signing the convention. This requires a sharp picture of both their obligations and their rights stemming from the convention. The balance of rights and obligations is perhaps the most important ingredient of universality. A situation where States parties, with all their political, financial and other obligations, were practically negatively discriminated against compared to some of the non-parties, would seem to be going against the requirement of reasonableness. In this field, we think that the approach outlined by the distinguished Ambassador of France in his 13 February plenary statement is a very positive one and merits further exploration.