Proposal Abstract J122(A85)

1. Arms Control Problem:

- (a) Nuclear weapons partial test ban
 - comprehensive test ban
 - peaceful nuclear explosions
 - ballistic missiles
 - cruise missiles
 - manned aircraft
 - missile tests
 - mobile ballistic missiles
 - reentry vehicles
 - anti-ballistic missiles
- (b) Regional arms control outer space - sea bed

2. Verification Type:

- (a) Remote sensors satellite
 - ground-based
 - aerial
 - shipboard
 - radar
 - ELINT
 - sampling
- (c) Seismic sensors intra-border stations
 - extra-border stations

3. Source:

Richelson, Jeffrey. "Technical Collection and Arms Control". In Verification and Arms Control, pp. 169-216. Edited by William C. Potter. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1985.

4. Summary:

This article describes and evaluates American national technical means which are used to collect intelligence concerning all aspects of strategic arms programs which may be relevant to US participation in arms control agreements. Richelson argues that "although certain technical collection activities are of little or no relevance to the monitoring of an agreement, it can be legitimately claimed that all collection relevant to the strategic capabilities of the nation constrained by the agreement is relevant" (pp. 204-205). Five methods of technical collection are discussed: photographic reconnaissance/imaging, signals intelligence, ocean surveillance, space surveillance and nuclear monitoring. These technologies are relevant to the following treaties or agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (see abstract J120(T63)); the Outer Space Treaty (see abstract B24(T67)); the Sea Bed Treaty (see abstract B30(T71)); the ABM Treaty (see abstract J67(T72)); the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (see abstract