

ence of ethics. When a man wills so as to conform to moral law, his volition proceeds from himself; it is *he* that acts, and not something that acts *on* him; but, when he is hurried away by an immediate desire—say by a revengeful impulse—it is not his true self that acts, and he is not truly free.

In thus opposing Theoretical and Practical Philosophy, Kant has prepared the way for a well-known characteristic of his doctrine, the exaltation of the Practical over the Theoretical Reason,—the “primacy of Practical Reason,” as it is usually called. If, as he contends, the true man is the man who wills the moral law—and for Kant there is no other kind of willing—we must seek for the true nature of man by asking what is implied in the *moral* consciousness. The theoretical consciousness reveals to us only external appearances; it can but reduce the multifarious things of sense to a mechanical system, or even in its highest reach suggest that there may be something beyond; but it is only the practical or moral consciousness that compels us to believe in our own freedom and immortality and in the existence of God.

The abrupt contrast of theoretical and practical reason characteristic of the philosophy of Kant naturally led to divergent views. One class of thinkers, representing what has been called “naturalism,” cut the knot by denying *in toto* that we can determine anything in regard to the region lying beyond the sphere of knowledge. At the same time the influence of Kant upon them is so far evident that they admit the existence of a reality lying beyond our knowledge, while they claim that of it we can say nothing except that it is. This is the attitude

of thinkers like Huxley and Tyndall, who found a philosophic exponent in the late Herbert Spencer. For all thinkers of this school the sole knowable forms of being are those that can be brought within the mechanical system of nature, and though they claim that what we thus know is the relative and phenomenal, they deny that we can extend our knowledge beyond this limited region. A second class of thinkers attack the problem left by Kant in an entirely different way. They maintain that the abstract opposition of the theoretical and practical reason is untenable, and therefore they deny that ultimately there is any fundamental opposition between faith and knowledge. This is the attitude of Hegel and of the English Idealists. Hegel makes two main criticisms of Kant. In the first place, he denies the abstract opposition of faith and knowledge, and therefore the abstract opposition of theoretical and practical reason upon which it is based. In the second place, he maintains that the reason for this false contrast is the unwarranted assumption that the highest conception involved in experience is that of a mechanical system of individual things. It is this general line of thought that has been followed by the English Idealists. The first representative of this point of view was the late T. H. Green, who endeavored to develop the positive part of the Kantian doctrine, while refusing to accept the principle of the primacy of practical reason. Green maintained with Kant that our ordinary experience of things presupposes the operation of the distinguishing and combining activity of thought. This being so, he claimed that, as the world of experience ex-