

other representative bodies, should make arrangements to render assistance in connection with the proposed new charter. It is a work of vast importance, and it will have considerable influence in the future growth, good government and prosperity of the City of Montreal. No work could fall more legitimately within the scope of a properly organized Municipal Association. If it becomes law in its present shape, neither the Municipal Association nor any other outside body will have much influence upon the actions of future City Councils. The commercial community and general body of rate-payers must not stand aside, and through carelessness, apathy and indifference, permit legislation relating to the future government of the City to pass without close scrutiny.

### THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE.

In considering the chances for terminating the war between the United States and Spain, many peculiar features of the present situation have to be borne in mind. That the hitherto victorious Americans will accept any suggestions for peace which do not involve the abandonment by Spain of Cuba and Puerto Rico is not now even hinted at in papers opposed to any extension of United States territory, and it seems more than likely that entire occupation of the Philippines will only be abandoned in exchange for an equivalent in money value when indemnity for the war is being reckoned. It is very unfortunate that the Spanish government have almost rendered hopeless any direct negotiations for immediate peace. Their policy of concealing the truth regarding the reverses to their fleets and armies has rendered impossible any discussion of the terms of peace. To make the people of Spain understand the necessity for accepting whatever conditions may be imposed by the United States, the rulers of Spain will have to make known the complete destruction of her ships and will have to admit the virtual impossibility of successfully waging further war against a powerful enemy.

Until the Spanish people are compelled to comprehend the full extent of the disasters the nation has met with on land and sea, no progress towards peace is possible, and of the effect of this knowledge upon the pride and passion of the Spaniards no one seems able to judge.

The *New York Commercial Bulletin*, in reviewing the position of affairs says :—

Would Spaniards be likely to trust the making of a peace to a Ministry that had thus hoodwinked and befooled them? We doubt whether there is a statesman in Spain who would dare to propose peace, in good faith, under such conditions. The present Government can do nothing but dally with impossible proposals, with the hope of getting time for a new set of disasters to compel the popular acceptance of terms which would now be rejected. This is a dangerous game to play; but it is the present Govern-

ment's only possible course. Its success depends upon Sagasta being able to keep the people still ignorant of the hopelessness of Spain's prospects. Failing in that, there is no saying what may come; Carlism, or a republic, or some still worse form of confusion that will invite interventions and makeshifts which may make peace utterly uncertain.

It is not inconceivable that Sagasta may try the experiment of proposing peace on paltry conditions which he knows the United States cannot accept. He might thereby win some support from the peace party and would be able to throw the onus of prolonging the war upon this country. But that would be no contribution towards peace. It would be the means of stimulating Spaniards to greater desperation; but, by that very result, it would only extend the opportunity for developing the tendencies towards internal conflict which constitute the great danger to Spain and to peace. Another fact making against Spain's seeking peace is that, excepting at Santiago, her army has as yet had no chance to measure force against ours. She has now some 125,000 troops in Cuba, most of which are very strongly entrenched around the fortifications of Havana. It is not to be expected that Spanish pride will readily consent to a surrender until these forces have had a chance for vindicating the national valor. The army is politically one of the most influential institutions of Spain, and it would be a perilous experiment for the Government to sue for peace until its generals have had a fair opportunity for defending the military reputation of the nation. In view of the foregoing considerations, it seems out of the question that Spain should ask for peace in the present unripe stage of the struggle.

To our side, also, the existing situation is unpropitious for a settlement. We have well-deliberated plans for the accomplishment of our purposes, which in every case are but in their incipient stage. The capture of Santiago is only the first step towards the conquest of Cuba. The campaign against Porto Rico is only in its beginnings. In the Philippines we have got only a foothold; the completion of our occupation must wait on the expulsion of the Spanish forces at every point and the pacification of the natives, who threaten serious complications. We have considered it necessary to send a fleet to Spain in order the more effectively to compel the acceptance of our ultimate terms of settlement; but our ships have not yet sailed. We are thus but in the beginnings of our work.

Moreover, our purposes are fixed. What we have undertaken to accomplish in Cuba, in Porto Rico and in the Philippines we mean to achieve without recession or abatement. There is no pretence or feint in any part of our plans of campaign which would admit of abatements in our terms. Our preparations have been made upon a scale which insures our complete success in the overthrow and permanent exclusion of Spanish power at every one of these points; and, this being the case, we have no misgivings about our strength that might warrant premature negotiations for peace. We have undertaken a great and risky project; we have staked a vast outlay upon our purposes; we have raised large expectations among our people, whom we are bound not to disappoint;