

our most recent meeting on February 1, however, Mr. Menon finally proposed, over the Poles' bitter objections, to forward a letter to the North for comment on the Kontum incident.<sup>30</sup> In this instance he had no option; he informed me privately that he was acting on instructions from his Government. (It may be noted that Mr. Menon's proposal fell far short of our own, which has been to make an immediate investigation of the attack.)

7. We are still not entirely sure whether in stalling on the Russian airlift and previously on Kontum, Mr. Menon has been acting on his own or on instructions from New Delhi. Certain things are sure however: (a) that Mr. Menon locally is receiving advice from a source which is indisputably hostile to our point of view – his ex-Senior Political Adviser and now Chief Administrative Officer, Brij Kumar; (b) that there are close personal friendly relations between several senior members of the Indian Delegation and members of the Polish Delegation; (c) that Mr. Menon himself, while asserting the need for objectivity, shares a view of Communism common to many Indians, namely, that it represents a revolt against Imperialism and is therefore deserving of more or less active sympathy.

8. In amplification of these last points it may be noted that our Delegation has long regarded Brij Kumar as the most influential of the Indian team and at the same time its most anti-Western – not to say pro-Communist – representative. He and his wife spend long hours in drinking and card playing with the Poles, in particular with H. Wolf, who we understand from Intelligence sources is the No. 1 Party man of the Polish Delegation. Next to Brij Kumar, and nominally the Indian Delegation's Senior Political Adviser, is M.D. Shahane, a man of liberal outlook and reasonable nature but at the same time deeply suspicious of Western motives and very much under the influence – as are all members of the Indian Delegation – of Brij Kumar.

9. Mr. Menon's sympathy with the struggle of the Vietnamese Communists to rid themselves of French colonialism and the continuing efforts of the Northern régime to free Vietnam of "American Imperialism" makes him susceptible, in our view, to suggestions that the Americans are evading in clandestine and wholesale fashion the terms of the Geneva Agreements regarding importations of arms. He does not hide his belief that because of this the Commission should seek to attempt some kind of "balance" between North and South and not seek to press too hard allegations that the North is indulging in the same sort of thing. This attitude, of course, overlooks the fact that the Commission's control system in the South is a far more effective one than in the North (for instance, Saigon Fixed Team Controls the airport here but there are no controls at Hanoi's airports). It overlooks also that over the years there has been continuous notification of arms imports into the South whereas not a single item of war equipment has ever been reported as entering the North. It disregards also evidence which goes to show that far from attempting to evade the control system the Americans have been most scrupulous in their efforts to comply with Commission requirements.

10. Personal relations with Mr. Menon and other members of the Indian Delegation remain cordial and we are not overly-concerned with the situation. It seemed to me, however, that these observations concerning the Chairman might help to explain the protracted delays in recent months in obtaining action on items we regard as urgent. Moreover the time may come when we may need assistance from New Delhi to induce Mr. Menon to take action on some particularly important item.

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<sup>30</sup> Voir/See Jacques Nevard, "Aggression Laid to Vietnam Reds," *New York Times*, November 9, 1960, p. 37.