

CHARITY—BEQUEST FOR GENERAL CHARITABLE PURPOSES—OBJECTS OF CHARITY
NOT DEFINED—DISPOSITION OF FUND BEQUEATHED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES—SCHEME OF CHARITY—SIGN MANUAL.

In re Pyne, Lilley v. Attorney-General (1903) 1 Ch. 83, a testatrix had bequeathed a fund for such charitable purposes as might hereafter be set forth in the codicil to her will. She died without making any codicil, and it was held that the bequest was a valid bequest for general charitable purposes. An application was then made to Byrne, J., to determine whether the disposition of the fund was to be carried out by means of a scheme under the Court, or by the King by warrant under the Sign Manual. The learned Judge held that the fund was subject to the disposition of the King by warrant under the Sign Manual. Query as to the proper authority in Canada to execute such regal powers? *Semble*, the Lieutenant Governors.

CONTEMPT—ATTACHMENT—SERVICE OF ORDER.

In re Seal (1903) 1 Ch. 87, an application was made to attach a solicitor for not delivering a bill of costs pursuant to order. The order was made on 3rd July, 1902, and required delivery of the bill within fourteen days from service. This order was served, but by an order made on 5th August, on the application of the solicitors, the time for delivery was extended to August 26th. This order was not drawn up. The application was to attach for not delivering the bills pursuant to the orders of 3rd July and 5th August. Byrne, J., held that the motion must fail for want of service of the order of 5th August before the time thereby limited had expired, and that it was necessary for the applicants to get out a new order limiting a further time before they would be in a position to apply for an attachment.

NUISANCE—RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO SUE FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PUBLIC RIGHT
—ATTORNEY-GENERAL WHERE UNNECESSARY PARTY—PARTIES—PRACTICE.

Boyce v. Paddington (1903) 1 Ch. 109, may be briefly referred to as it involves a discussion of a point of practice, and Buckley, J., reaffirms the rule that a plaintiff suing for an interference with a public right need not join the Attorney-General as a party plaintiff (1) where the interference complained of involves also an interference with some private right of the plaintiff, or (2) where no private right of the plaintiff is involved, but he in respect of his