

from the products of his own labor. Rogues would find no sanctuary by fleeing across a boundary line. There would be little risk in trusting a people, where branches of our own race and language are dominant, to mingle and co-operate in our system of self-government, and we are by no means "so near of kin that we can never be united." Local liberty and local organization would be preserved. But the advantages to them would be infinitely superior to all that would ever accrue to us. The constable would take the place of their standing army. The fear of becoming the American cock-pit in case of a war with Great Britain would be dispelled, and the Canadas would not only enjoy complete reciprocity, but would be our latest and youngest pets, to whom the most liberal national appropriations for all needful improvements would not be refused. Their forests and unoccupied fields, their mines and vacant mill privileges, would attract the captains of industry and tempt the capital of our whole people. Even the smallest of our States would furnish effective re-enforcements. The deposits in the savings-banks of Rhode Island alone are nearly equal to the entire banking capital of the whole Canadian dominion.

Our own territory, however, is sufficiently large to hold all the population of a first-rate power among nations, including the accretions of future centuries, and we have a soil and climate so broad and various as to furnish all the chief products required by the most advanced civilization. Any future territorial additions would add little to our felicity and nothing to our prosperity or security; and yet no one can be entirely deaf to the voice of political prophets or deny that manifest destiny persists in pointing out with an unmoving finger that one flag must ultimately cover and protect all Americans who speak the same language, and whose highest development possibly awaits that crowning event. The remote and varied interests of the different parts of the British possessions, sundered as they are by magnificent distances, by unexplored wildernesses, by mountains, and by oceans, lakes, and rivers, or in winter by seas of ice, will forever prompt a closer American combination. But American statesmen, unlike those of the European continent, should do nothing to force or unduly hasten such a combination, and certainly should do nothing to absolutely bar or retard it by a losing and paltry substitute for it in the form of a reciprocity treaty. Patriotism requires that we should study the most exalted interests of our own people, and these interests would be jeopardized, as it seems to me, and certainly the collateral question of annexation indefinitely postponed, by treating the Canadian dominion with more favor than we treat any other foreign dominion. Nor does it belong to us to allay the discontents of any outlying provinces of Great Britain by remitting duties which they now rightfully pay and by throwing both the burden and discontent upon our own people.

It is now said, as it was in 1844, "make the reciprocity treaty, and Canadian annexation is only a question of time." That might be proclaimed with equal fluency, and with the added force of some possible grains of truth, in the negative form, by saying "no treaty, and annexation is only a question of time;" but our Republic, having the vantage-ground of absolute independence, should stand on its own self-respect and yield nothing in advance to vague hints of a doubtful future nuptial ceremony. The idea that annexation would be the logical sequence of reciprocity is not only absurd, but has been thoroughly exploded by our past experience as a weak dominion, and as flickering as the *aurora borealis*, which vanishes with the first streak of morning light. Canadians are not yet republicans, and