

was confined in fact to the roads because of its limitation to wheeled vehicles. These are things which should be receiving the attention of this government, which should be discussed in this House of Commons, and upon which we should have recommendations. We should know whether the government supports these suggestions or whether it does not, and whether it intends to put up the money to make the necessary policy effective.

In so far as our air division is concerned, Mr. Speaker, the situation is much more urgent and more dangerous. The government of this country agreed on behalf of Canada in the summer of 1959 to adopt for Canada, for its air division overseas, a strike reconnaissance role. Those of us who were in the house at the time remember the debate. The Liberal party opposed the idea of adopting that role. We thought there were other things which Canada could do which were more suited to our capacity. Notwithstanding that, the government continued with its commitment. Four years have now passed and when we were over there in November we found that the first squadron of planes in Zweibrücken was about to be airborne in the following month, December of last year. We were told all eight squadrons of the planes would be there and in place during the calendar year 1963. We were also told that the first squadron was intended to go on target on May 1, 1963 and that in order to go on target a bilateral agreement would have to be signed with the United States by November 1 last because of the length of time, approximately six months, required for the technical details to be worked out for the equipment to be put in place and for the airmen to be trained.

Well, Mr. Speaker, NATO headquarters in Europe puts a very high priority on that particular project. The infrastructure, as it is called, the runway extensions and the ammunition depots to contain these weapons were being built under top NATO priority. It was being considered by the supreme commander and his associates to be an urgent matter because it was recognized that Canada, at the time we were there in November, was in default. Well, if we were in default then we are that much more in default at the present time.

Let me say something about the question of building up conventional forces in NATO as against the necessity for more tactical capacity. A considerable amount has been said about that, particularly by hon. members of the New Democratic party. When the strategy of massive retaliation began to come into question it became obvious to a number of people, including some military men, that the NATO forces in Europe should have a wider

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variety of choice, a greater non-nuclear capacity, and so it was espoused in this house and other places that the conventional capacity of those forces should be increased.

General Maxwell Taylor of the United States put this forward in a book called "The Uncertain Trumpet." He is now chairman of the chiefs of staff committee in that country and is one of the closest military advisors to the President in the United States. However, Mr. Speaker, there is no immediate prospect of an adequate non-nuclear force and the necessity for a combined or mixed force remains. This point was made very clear.

Let me review very briefly what the problem is. When NATO was first organized and the Lisbon force goals were set, it was considered we would require something of the order of 90 divisions in Europe equipped with conventional weapons. These goals were never met, for political and economic reasons, and the United States supplemented the existing force by the development of a whole family of nuclear tactical weapons, and during the intervening years these have been the reserve force which has prevented aggression on the continent of Europe. Now a desperate attempt is being made to build up conventional forces to provide a greater choice of response, what they call the doctrine of measured response; but what is important to remember is this, that the 1966 force goals, if they are achieved, will bring into being in Europe a force of something like 30 to 33 divisions, and this is from one third to one half the force necessary to resist all out attack should the enemy decide to move in force across the continent of Europe.

In the meantime it is considered absolutely essential to supplement the conventional forces with tactical nuclear weapons. In this respect the strike reconnaissance role is considered a very important, indeed essential role. It is to seek out fixed and moving targets in enemy territory and to destroy them in the event of hostilities.

The total tactical capacity on the continent of Europe at the present time is less than was planned, and the reason for this is because the people there hoped by now to put into place a number of intermediate range ballistic missiles, but because of lack of agreement among the members of the NATO alliance those are not yet in place. Consequently the demands on the remaining tactical forces are greater than they were ever anticipated to be. Consequently the supreme allied commander is convinced that the contribution that Canada has agreed to make, which is a considerable percentage of the total tactical capacity of the tactical air forces in Europe, must be armed in accordance with the agreement this government made in 1959, advice