

Supply—National Defence

spent—I say “spent” but I actually mean “wasted”—close to half a billion dollars on the Arrow, an aircraft which was never necessary. All that the defence of Canada aircraft—I wish to start that again because I should like to make it clear.

Mr. Hellyer: It was clear enough the first time.

Mr. Winch: All that defence of Canada aircraft have to do is to identify hostile aircraft as such. Neither fighter aircraft nor missiles such as the Bomarc or Nike-Hercules can ever hope to shoot down every atomic bomber, and in the thermonuclear age nothing else makes sense. The CF-105 could have been and the CF-100 is and will remain, I am told by military authorities, quite good enough to identify any Russian bomber flying over Canada toward the United States. So long as we retain this capability the U.S.S.R. would not dare to attack the United States across Canada since the U.S.S.R. must destroy all the United States strategic air command or accept the same thermonuclear annihilation that she would like to visit upon the United States.

Mr. Benidickson: That is the deterrent; that is the reason for deterrent expenditure.

Mr. Winch: As long as we can prevent undetected hostile flights over Canadian territory we have satisfied all the requirements of good neighbourliness that the mighty power to the south can reasonably demand. In Canada, Mr. Chairman, we require neither the Bomarc nor nuclear warheads. Neither can we afford the price of these weapons and in addition the cost of a proper defence in keeping with our needs.

It is for these reasons, that we call upon the government to make clear immediately to our friends that we have no need for and will not tolerate the placing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. By this firm stand we sincerely and honestly believe, after much study, that Canada can make a decisive contribution to easing, and indeed perhaps reversing, the dangerous trend to worldwide disposition of nuclear weapons.

We in this group were opposed to the setting up of NORAD and we still feel that more would have been gained and less lost if we had extended NATO in such a way as to have provided for whatever additions to air defence that may have been necessary for the defence of North America so as to have applied generally to all NATO countries. We feel also that Canada should exercise far greater control over the distant early warning line, and at the same time we must re-evaluate the whole basis upon which the United States maintains air bases on

Canadian soil to the end that we can give back to our foreign policy the flexibility which Canadian security demands.

I have no hesitation, nor has this group, in saying: Let us remain a member of NATO, for any further soviet advance in Europe must be to our disadvantage. But we must insist upon a reappraisal of NATO's basic military policy. NATO cannot hope to defend Europe against a massive atomic attack. That power rests with the retaliatory might of the United States. But we can, with a better balanced and more highly mobile defence force in Europe, defend the area against any soviet non-nuclear attack. This must remain NATO's task. We feel it can be done effectively if the purpose is now made effectively clear. There must of course, also be a willingness to limit NATO's sphere of operations in Europe, provided that a similar concession is forthcoming from Russia at the same time.

We very strongly believe that the western powers should be prepared to consider the negotiation of a neutral belt in central Europe which, on our part, would mean the withdrawal of troops from Germany and, for the soviet, the withdrawal from East Germany and the bordering soviet satellites. I feel very strongly that this combination of policy would enable NATO to defend western Europe in the only situation under which it can offer a defence, namely against a non-nuclear attack. It would prove a desire on our part or it would give an indication on our part of our willingness to negotiate a settlement of the arms race in at least one of the critical areas of the world.

In view of the dangers to which Canada could reasonably be expected to be exposed, and at the same time be realistic in our views as to what Canada could reasonably be expected to do in various circumstances, it seems to us that Canada's main role in the defence of the free world should be in the creation, control and training of an extremely mobile force which could be deployed in any part of the world to fight in any sudden outbreak which held the danger of developing into a full-scale war. We feel that these Canadian forces, along the lines we are suggesting, should be placed at the disposal of the United Nations, when and if required. You may call it a police force, if you like. It was called a police force not so long ago by the Leader of the Opposition.

When we discuss this statement we should like to hear from the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence as to what has happened to all their high-sounding phrases about a United Nations police force. Where was there in the white paper, and where has

[Mr. Winch.]