

were starting the engines and one at least of these was observed to fall. When he returned his machine was full of holes caused by machine guns with which the aerodrome was armed.

(signed) Major Jack Scott  
O.C. 60 Squadron, R.F.C. <sup>(1)</sup>

Major Scott's report does not betray any doubts or misgivings about the accuracy or veracity of Bishop's exploit. Would he have written such a commendation if, as the film suggests, it was already generally known that Bishop's accounts of his actions were inflated to the point of fraudulence and that official acceptance of Bishop's reports was already causing open dissension among members of the squadron? At the same time, the report gives some general indication of the condition of Bishop's plane on his return, noting that it was "full of holes caused by machine guns with which the aerodrome was armed". Further documentary information about the condition of Bishop's plane comes in another confidential report to Headquarters on 30 June 1917, almost four weeks after the attack took place:

Reference our telephone conversation of to-day.  
Herewith information as requested:

1. Time left aerodrome 3.57 a.m.  
Time arrived at Hostile Aerodrome, 4.25 a.m.  
Time arrived back 5.40 a.m.
2. Personal evidence only.
3. Damage done - 17 Bullet holes. Trailing edge of plane shot away in two bays.
4. Distance 30 miles. Aerodrome S. of CAMBRAI. <sup>(2)</sup>

Your Committee finds this document of particular significance for a number of reasons. It was submitted by Captain Caldwell who had temporarily replaced Major Scott as Officer Commanding the 60th Squadron. It underlines the fact that no confirmation for the raid had been found, if indeed it had ever been sought, in the weeks after the raid. It gives more precise information about the condition of Bishop's plane. Since evidence put before the Committee by Mr.

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<sup>(1)</sup> *Ibid.* Appendix "VA-1-C", 17 October 1985, p. 3A:6.

<sup>(2)</sup> Referred to in *Proceedings*, 28 November 1985, p. 6:66.