were concerned about the possibility of Canadian troops being mistaken for United Kingdom troops and that incidents might take place especially if the proportion of Canadian troops to the total force were high as would be the case if the Canadian infantry battalion had arrived at that time.

We in New York, and indeed in Ottawa on advice from New York, felt that these difficulties would be overcome, and in discussing them with the Secretary-General he once again asked us to make no changes in our plans pending further discussions and he hoped satisfactory arrangements could be made. So the government went ahead with the arrangements as originally contemplated.

## Composition of the Force

These difficulties I have been talking about, difficulties of administration and difficulties of composition, were not unique to Canada. Indeed they were not surprising considering the fact that the United Nations was starting from nothing in organizing this force; with the political situation so difficult both at the United Nations and in Egypt, and considering also the fact that under the resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to organize this force he was instructed to work out—the phrase that was used was a "balanced force"—a balanced force militarily for police work and a balanced force; as he interpreted it, geographically and politically if possible.

Perhaps I should interject at this point, in connection with this particular difficulty, that among the countries that have offered contributions are Roumania and Czechoslovakia. Countries other than Canada have made offers of contributions which have not been dealt with, and they are waiting to hear from the Secretary-General also. The problem now was a very difficult and complicated one, all the more so as the greatest need at that time was to get more people to the spot.

Well, then, I think it was on Tuesday, November 13, when back in New York from Ottawa that I had another talk with the Secretary-General in relation to the new difficulties which had cccurred, I emphasized to him at that time that we felt it absolutely essential to the success of this effort that neither Egypt nor any other country should impose conditions regarding the composition of the force. I told him that on this matter we would negotiate only with him, the Secretary-General, although we recognized, of course, that it was right and proper that he should discuss these matters with Egypt in order to avoid, if possible, subsequent difficulties.

Nevertheless, on that Tuesday I asked him again about composition in view of the developing difficulties, and whether we should proceed with our plans for moving the regiment. The Secretary-General said--this was Tuesday, November 13, and I quote from his statement to me which I took down, that he hoped we would go right ahead with our plans.