reality that, despite all the commentary and analysis, there is no consensus on what the RMA means. If it is in fact a revolution, then the force of technological change and what it offers, may be no more amenable to control that most previous innovations in weaponry. If what is taking place is just evolutionary, then it may be all the more difficult to subject to arms control since the RMA will involve continual incremental technological progress designed specifically to enhance force multiplier effects.

If the RMA is seen as a combination of weapons and associated technologies, military organization and doctrine, it is evident that arms control is primarily concerned with the first component. Yet, while arms control regimes may not deal directly with changes in military organization and doctrine the fact that these are generally observable can be said to support the control of the RMA to the extent that such changes may signal that countries are developing RMA-related capabilities. Here, arms control method of "collateral analysis" and two very simple "systems" of verification can be useful, literature survey and international information exchange through various methods, including public announcements. The organization of armed forces, particularly in the West is no secret. Governments including, and especially , the U.S. government, are quite open in terms of how their militaries are structured. Indeed, with regard to the RMA in particular, there is much public fanfare about the re-organization of services and commands to better utilize the technologies of the RMA. Moreover, there is a plethora of open secondary sources, such as *The Military Balance,* and various defence industry-related journals, which track in detail the world's militaries. As for doctrine, here too a great deal is in the public domain. The military services of a number of countries regularly publish doctrine in unclassified sources and the professional military journals are filled with various doctrinal debates on the RMA.

It is the technologies and the weapons based upon them that would need to be regulated if the RMA was to be subjected to any kind of verifiable arms control regime. Some of the problems with this have been discussed above. A good deal of the technology comes from the civilian sector, particularly the computer industry. Advances in micro-processing of information have been married to familiar weapons systems such as missiles, aircraft and naval platforms which are themselves acceptable weapons or already, as in the case of missiles difficult to control under existing regimes such as the MTCR. Then there is the large realm of command, control, communication and intelligence technologies that support the weapons and give them their improved accuracy and lethality.

The susceptibility of RMA weapons and technologies to traditional arms control methods, systems and regimes is presented in Table One which uses the approach taken by Cleminson's and Gilman's 1981 study, *A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification.*[77]

As indicated in the table there are many difficulties that would be encountered in trying to

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[77] F.R. Cleminson and E. Gilman, *A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1981).