

welfare spending (ie: for every dollar spent on the armed forces, two are spent on public health and education). The worst cases are Chad and Mauritania, whose military/social welfare spending ratios are only 1:1.3 (although were data for the Sudan complete, it would almost certainly score below a 1:1.0 ratio).⁴ Likewise, Morocco and Egypt just reach a 1:1.5 threshold, with Mali at 1:1.6 and Tunisia at 1:2.4. By contrast, Algeria, even in the nascent stages of its civil war, still had a ratio of 1:4.5, which reflected the strong educational and health service that had earlier been built on its oil revenues, and Niger, an extremely poor state, nevertheless managed to spend \$3.40 on health and education for every dollar spent in 1993 on the armed forces.⁵

An interesting comparison can be made here with the situation in Central and South America. Despite different scaling for the data in Figures 7, 13 and 19, the military/social welfare spending *ratios* are still themselves somewhat comparable. Only one state in Latin America (Colombia) out of 17 fell below a 1:2.0 ratio for military and social welfare spending, with six others falling between 1:2.0 and 1:2.5 (El Salvador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay). In North Africa, by contrast, five of ten states fall below even a 1:1.5 threshold (including, by estimate, Sudan). A quick comparison with data for the early 1990s (not shown here) indicates that the position of many Latin American states has improved recently, while that of North Africa has declined. More comparisons are needed, but as a general measure of changing government priorities, this ratio hold some promise as a comparative benchmark.⁶

There is no clear *prima facie* relationship between military expenditure and economic growth evidenced from Figure 20 on the next page, with both high and low military spenders more or less anchoring the four corners of the table (Libya and Niger on the "low growth" side; Egypt and Chad on the "high growth" side). The poor growth record of the region is, however, noteworthy: six of ten states have suffered negative growth over the past decade, with those embroiled in protracted civil conflicts scoring poorly (the Tuareg rebellion and recent coup in Niger, civil wars in Sudan and Algeria). States such as Libya, Sudan and Mauritania again stand out as possible candidates that would gain from a reallocation of resources away from the military sector, while states such as Egypt or Morocco do not seem to have suffered excessively (in comparative terms) from their relatively high level of military expenditure.

⁴ If one uses Sudan's 1990 expenditures (adjust to 1993 dollars), one obtains a ratio of 1:1.0. Data from Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1993 and 1996*.

⁵ Libya likewise scores a ratio of 1:2.1 if 1990 education spending figures (in 1993 dollars) are used, putting it at the upper end of the scale.

⁶ This has been noted by the United Nations Development Program, since its annual *Human Development Report* provides a similar ratio index. The so-called 20:20 proposal for the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development (20 percent of public spending to human development priorities, with 20 percent of IDA similarly targeted) was also based on this reasoning. It was not, however, accepted by the summit as a benchmark for multilateral action.