

assurance that they will receive assistance to use and profit from the technologies that are made available.

There is an important political or perceptual "gap" here between the North and the South, which promises to complicate enormously the task of designing effective conventional non-proliferation measures.<sup>55</sup> From the Southern perspective three issues are important: national security concerns and the right of self-defence, the perceived "right of access" to high-technology as part of economic development assistance, and the transparency of restraint regimes. Most of these concerns can be addressed, but they require a different (and more complex) sort of bargain than that which informs conditional technology *access* measures, where participating states can be assumed to share certain common goals and perceptions, and where the linkages that make the regime work do not extend beyond to other issues areas (such as development assistance). As a result, conditional technology assistance relationships will most likely be bilateral, and will have to link technological development assistance to certain sectors (precision machines, or information technologies) to strong end-use guarantees, to participation in universal non-proliferation measures (the UN register, the CWC), or to regional confidence and security-building processes.

The third type of mixed measure would link restraint on both the demand and the supply side of conventional armaments to the *development of security guarantees* in regions such as the Middle East, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia or Latin America. This would treat the development of controls on conventional proliferation as an integral part of regional confidence and security-building (or arms control) processes, such as in the ongoing Middle East multilateral discussions on regional security. Since measures to constrain proliferation in this category would follow from broader peace and security-building processes, they will not be discussed further here.

The fourth mixed measure would link proposals to control conventional proliferation to *other non-proliferation measures*, in particular to those that impose costs and burdens on supplier and producer states as a *quid pro quo* for restraint among potential recipients. One example of such a linkage (which does not concern conventional weapons) is the connection that has been drawn between the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty among nuclear powers and the extension or renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Analogous measures in the conventional realm could involve the forswearing of ballistic missile defence programs as a concomitant to an expanded MTCR, or the expansion of the UN Register of Conventional Arms to include not just weapons

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<sup>55</sup> Evidence of this has emerged from the 1993-94 discussions in the Disarmament Commission on draft guidelines on "the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields."