

staff officers who have no personal experience of war and who are subject to no effective political control. What struck me very much, looking back on the history of the last 40 years, is the wisdom shown by people like President Eisenhower who had actually been responsible for fighting a war and also understood the way in which the armed services and industrial corporations distort policy in order to strengthen their institutional interests.

I think, also, some responsibility, for the mess we are in, lies on what I might call the defence intelligentsia who developed all these brilliant, abstract theories about nuclear war. Herman Kahn really started it with his book on escalation, when he was working at the Rand Corporation. I don't want to be too rude to the defence intelligentsia because there are so many of its representatives here tonight. I am a great admirer of that old Italian philosopher, Machiavelli, who, when he was asked on his death bed to renounce Satan and all his works, replied, "This is no time to be making enemies." But I would advise those who study these matters in universities to read the moving apologies of Tom Schelling, perhaps the most brilliant of their tribe, at an IISS conference after the Vietnam War.

I am coming now to the present day after this tedious attempt to describe what has happened over the last 40 years.

What is very striking to anybody who has been practically involved in the problems, as I was as Secretary of Defence for six years in Britain in the sixties, is that the stability of the strategic balance has been pretty invulnerable to very large variations in the relative capability of the two sides. What worries me deeply is that weapons, which are now under development and, indeed, some of which are already being deployed by both sides, could upset the stability of the strategic balance as we have known it for the last 40 years. Let me point to at least four areas of development which threaten stability.

The first, which is already established, is the development of anti-satellite weapons which could destroy the enemy's ability to know what was happening — destroy the eyes and ears of the enemy.

The second is the deployment of missiles in forward areas, which will hit their targets so fast that the enemy will have to launch on warning and the decision to launch will have to be taken not by human beings but by the microcircuits of computers. If I can take a specific example, the Soviet SS-22 and -23 missiles, which have