

merely defined the nature and general functions of the Panel and, pending later consideration of detailed directions to the Panel, allowed the Secretary-General to invite member states to nominate suitable officers for possible appointment. The second concluded that little or no advance planning was required in the political field, which was largely one for action by individual states. However, in both the economic and financial and the military fields, material factors were such that preliminary planning and effective co-ordination were required and these reports therefore elaborated in considerable detail various possible measures. It was emphasized that the success of the economic and financial measures would depend largely on the speed and thoroughness with which they were applied by member states and that the application of sanctions was likely to impose on some of the co-operating states serious burdens which would have to be equalized if full co-operation was to be obtained. The report on military measures, based largely on the Korean experience, concentrated on machinery which might be used to implement a United Nations decision to call on member states to take direct military action against aggression and, in particular, on the appointment, subsequent to such a decision, of an executive military authority (a state or group of states) to act on behalf of the United Nations in directing the actual conduct of operations.

The resolution adopted by the sixth session of the Assembly, on the proposal of a group of states members of the Collective Measures Committee, including Canada, took note of the Committee's report, recommended that member and non-member states should take such steps as they considered necessary to enable them to take action as suggested by the report, requested the Secretary-General to appoint members of the Panel of Military Experts, and — most important of all — directed the Committee to continue its work for another year and report to the Security Council at the next session of the General Assembly. This was a consolidation of what had been sketched out in broad terms during the previous session; it did not involve further commitments of any kind. The resolution was adopted by the overwhelming majority of 51 votes (including Canada) to 5 (the Soviet bloc), with 3 abstentions (Argentina, India and Indonesia). Thus there was very widespread support for the idea of collective security. However, no country was prepared — as replies to the Collective Measures Committee from member states had shown — to earmark forces without qualification for United Nations service in the event of aggression and there was no attempt to broaden the base of United Nations collective action in Korea. Indeed, the debate in the Political Committee of the Assembly was notable for the readiness of the sponsors of the resolution to accept amendments which were designed to ensure that the ultimate decision on participation in collective measures should rest firmly with individual states, that the Collective Measures Committee's report implied no obligations prior to a United Nations decision that action should be taken and that it should serve primarily the Security Council, and the General Assembly only in the absence of action by the Council.

Opposition to the resolution came from three main sources. Some member states, like India, regarded any attempt to organize