FERGUSON, J. A., reading the judgment of the Court, after setting out the facts, and referring to many authorities, said that the opening of the door of a standing train or street-car, at a regular stopping-place, is prima facie an invitation to alight; but opening it when the train or car is not at a stopping-place and is moving so fast as to make the motion perceptible to any reasonably careful passenger is not, without more, an invitation to alight; opening the door at a stopping-place and slowing down the train is some evidence of an invitation to alight. Circumstances alter cases—each case of any of these kinds must depend on its own circumstances.

The question in the case at bar was not: "Was the opening of the door of a moving car in itself negligence or an invitation to alight?" The question was: "Was it, in the circumstances of the case, an invitation to alight or part of the evidence or chain of circumstances going to make up an invitation?"

The plaintiff and another witness said that they thought that the car had actually stopped—it was in fact moving so slowly that the movement was not readily noticeable; and the jury concluded that, in the circumstances, the plaintiff had acted reasonably, carefully, and with ordinary prudence, in stepping off the car at the place where and when she did; that, the car having arrived at the stopping-place, and the plaintiff having, to the knowledge of the motorman, come to the door for the purpose of alighting, it was negligent of the motorman to open the door of the car when the car was moving so slowly as probably to deceive the plaintiff into the belief that it had actually stopped, and by his very act of opening the door strengthening that belief, and creating in the plaintiff's mind a belief that she should alight and might do so with safety.

These were questions of fact for the jury; and it could not be said that there was no evidence to support the findings of the jury, or that the jury acted unreasonably in finding that the opening of the door was a negligent act. If there is any reasonable evidence to support the finding of the jury, their verdict should stand—it is not the duty of an appellate Court to be astute to find reasons for setting aside verdicts: Commissioner for Railways v. Brown (1887), 13 App. Cas. 133, 134; Toronto R.W. Co. v. King, [1908] A.C. 260, 270.

There was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the jury; and the findings, when read in the light of the circumstances, supported the judgment.

Appeal dismissed with costs.