

"Have to buy our milk, sir. Don't give it to nobody but the boarders' children, on special terms."

"Got any whitefish?"

"Not this morning, sir. Only enough cooked for the boarders. Like some beefsteak?"

"Yes, if the boarders don't mind. And if there's anything else they haven't disposed of, you can bring us that too. We're not particular."

We linger over our last griddle cakes, photograph the rough, bright room, with its shocking chromos, indelibly upon our minds, and "settle." Nearly everybody is going to-day; two carriages are waiting now. It costs three cents to answer letters about rooms, and Byers never gratifies public curiosity at his own expense, on principle. Consequently the Sand Banks hostelry is overcrowded or empty always. He is everywhere this morning, coatless, hatless, as usual, with his slick, long, whitish hair pasted over his forehead, and his mouth turned down at the corners with its characteristic expression of disgusted forlornity. He shakes hands all round with genuine regret, and, just as we drive off, leans over toward me with a nod in Anastasia's direction. "Say," he whispers timorously, "what's her front name?"

SARA JEANNETTE DUNCAN.

THE COMING SLAVERY AND WOMAN SUFFRAGE.

Two years ago Mr. Herbert Spencer wrote a series of articles for the *Contemporary Review*, directing attention to a tendency of recent legislation. The purport of the articles was to point out that, whereas the distinctive feature of the Liberal policy in times past was the removal of all those fetters imposed by class or State on the free action of the individual, the legislation during the past few years has betrayed a decidedly opposite tendency, one which, if not checked, will land the people of England in a despotism worse than that from which they have been delivered. Passing in rapid review the principal measures of liberty wrested from the growing weakness of sovereigns, he shows by a number of recent acts that the Liberals, having, by a struggle extending over centuries, secured almost entirely free scope to the energies of the individual, are not content with this, but are now themselves becoming the advocates of the re-imposition of the fetters they had striven to remove. Of course, the new fetters will be imposed by Parliament, not by kings, and the people will, by their votes, be party to the imposition; but as Mr. Spencer very aptly remarks, the benefit arising from the change of masters is not very obvious, nor does the fact of the assent of the people alter the fact of the slavery. This being the course pursued by the Liberals, and the Tories not having changed their principles, Mr. Spencer views the future with unaffected alarm. But Mr. Spencer is not the only one to notice this tendency in legislation. M. de Laveleye and his followers of the Collective school have recognised it, but with joy, as in their view the future well-being of mankind depends on the development of the tendency. With the states of mind this tendency produces in different persons we have nothing to do. It is enough for us that eminent men of opposite schools agree on the fact of the tendency in England; for we may be sure that a wave of thought passing over England will not be long in making itself felt here. But the question of its reaching here is not one on which we need speculate. The acceptance with which so restrictive a measure as the Scott Act is received is evidence enough that the Collective sentiment has made great headway in Canada.

Thinking over this tendency and its effect on the actions of individuals, the question suggests itself, "In what temper will law exhibiting this tendency be received by its opponents? Will they, as is usual, quietly accept the decision of the majority, and cordially do their share of giving effect to it, or will they continue their opposition?" This is a question of much importance in all States, for, however supported by army and police the decrees of a sovereign may be, unless they have the support of the well-disposed citizens as well, obedience to them will, in some way, be evaded. But, in democratic States, the importance of this consideration is vital; for, outside a small police system, the only support a law can have in a democratic State is from the citizens. The necessity of a power in the law beyond that which we see in operation is apt to be lost sight of. We are so accustomed to its resistless sway, obliging the most powerful to bow to its will, that we are tempted to regard it as self-dependent as well as omnipotent. But this is one of those illusions, requiring only a word to dispel, and, were it not that the strength of our argument lies in a clear understanding of the power sustaining the laws of such a country as this, we should not venture to dwell on this head. The strength of the law lies in two circumstances. The first is that its officers are united and armed for the execution of its decrees; while those under the legal ban are neither, and thus a small body of men exercise a power quite out of proportion to their physical strength. But if it were not for the second circumstance, they would not long have a monopoly of the advantages arising from union. Criminals of all classes would soon combine to make common cause against their common enemy, if they were not restrained by the knowledge that the decisions of the law have the approval and, if necessary, would have the armed support of the whole body of well-disposed citizens. It is in this latent, but ever available, power that the real strength of the law lies.

But, except in the case of religious or political disturbances, it is never necessary for the law to make an exhibition of its real strength. The functions of our law are, in general, limited to the suppression of fraud or

violence, or if they go beyond that, and show a tendency to interfere with the private actions or property of individuals, the interference is so slight that, to even the most liberty-loving, it is alarming only as affording a precedent for less justifiable and more galling interferences. Within this scope then the law is heartily supported by all good citizens, and is thus irresistible. But are we entitled to assume this spirit of ready obedience in the case of laws which interfere directly with actions or property which we have been accustomed to regard as under our own control? To take an example or two: Will the Scott Act be heartily supported by its opponents? or (it is well known that Socialism has considerable power in some of our cities) suppose the majority decided to accept Mr. Henry George's theory, and establish State ownership of land, would the minority yield up their property cheerfully? It is evident, at once, that measures such as these, if they ever become laws would lack at least some of the sanctions supporting the laws as they now are. They would lack the moral sanction, for those opposed to them, at least, would never regard the drinking of a glass of beer or private ownership of land as on the same moral level as assaulting or defrauding a neighbour. They would, also, lack the sanction of supreme expediency, for those opposed to them do not consider them essential to the existence of the State as they do the laws respecting fraud and violence. These measures would have a strong sentiment in their favour, however—the sentiment that makes the will of the majority the rule of action for all. This sentiment governs us in all our social relations, from our school games to the election of Parliamentary representatives and the making of our laws, and so has for us all the force of an intuition. We would go a long way before doing violence to this sentiment; but most of us have a secret conviction that there are limits to the sphere within which the will of the majority is supreme. This conviction may take no other form than that of a vague, undefined sense of wrong, when what we consider our rights are interfered with; but it only requires the intellect and authority of some leader of thought to give definite form to this sense of wrong, and so, even this strong sentiment cannot be depended on to secure a cordial acceptance of such measures. But though measures such as these want all other sanctions for their obedience, they can still show one very good reason why they should be obeyed, and that is that they are supported by the preponderance of the physical force in the community. We do not mean to say that of those who obey a law which they believe to be interfering with their rights the greater number do so because of the force behind it. As we have already said, the majority of people are inclined to regard the law as omnipotent in itself, but there are some (and these are the leaders) who are under no such delusion. They examine the whole situation with care; and if they saw a chance of throwing off the yoke the law imposes, they would not be long in making the fact known to the less thoughtful. But while the mass of the physical force is against them, they know that they would be the sufferers in a struggle, and that the existence of the State would be thereby imperilled, so they quietly succumb or evade obedience, as indeed large numbers do.

Having seen that the laws of the nature we have been describing, lacking (for their opponents) the sanctions of morality and supreme expediency, and violating their notions of the righteousness of the will of the majority, secure obedience only through the presence of the physical force ready to support it, let us now consider the case where even this last sanction is absent, where the majority, numerically, is the weaker physically. What will be the consequence of this state of affairs? But before seeking an answer to our question, we must state that it is not a merely hypothetical case we are considering. Indeed, we have now reached the point towards which our argument has been tending. The state of affairs we have been describing, the reign of laws without any sanctions whatever for their authority, is precisely what the state of affairs would be in any community where women, by their votes, exercise any influence on legislation. That the majority in favour of any measure passed with the assistance of women will be the weaker physically will be apparent to any one who reflects that it is only on a measure, opposed by the majority of men, that women can possibly exercise any influence. If the majority of men were in favour of a measure it would become law anyway, and the votes of the women would only be confirmatory of those of the men. In the second place, that the only legislation in which women have hitherto shown any interest exhibits in a very high degree the tendency to interfere, so alarming to Mr. Spencer, no one with the slightest knowledge of public affairs need be told. In Canada and the United States the only question that has excited any general attention among women is the Temperance Question. Indeed, prominent temperance advocates of both sexes declare that their only object in urging the right of women to vote is that they may carry temperance legislation over the heads of the men. That the acquisition of the franchise may, to some extent, turn the attention of women to general politics is quite possible; but we need not stop to speculate on possibilities, we have fortunately only to do with certainties, and so, returning to the general tendency of legislation just now, and to woman's desire to advance that tendency, we are now in a position to answer the question put a moment ago: Is there any probability that laws, lacking all the usual sanctions for their authority, will be obeyed by those who oppose them? There would seem to be but one answer to this question, and yet it is an answer that most common-sense people would hesitate before accepting as decisive on the Woman Suffrage Question. Apart from the suspicion of mere plausibility attaching to every conclusion reached by a process of argumentation, most people find it hard to conceive of so well governed a country as this being in such an anarchical state as that indicated in our conclusion, and the frequent use we have been obliged to make of the term, "physical force," is apt to raise in their minds pictures of armed rebellions, not imaginable as arising from so