

to it, it is simply this:—mental states are but movements in the brain; thoughts, emotions, volitions are the necessary outcome of physiological process; conscience and morality are the result of nervous impressions and their combinations. We are frankly told that the human mind is but a “function of matter in certain combinations”; that the “brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile”; that men are “conscious automata”; and that, in short, man, mind and all, is ultimately reduced to carbonic acid, water and ammonia.

Bearing in mind that the problem to be solved is the meaning of man's moral nature; that the facts to be explained are the facts of his moral consciousness, the sense of the *ought* and *ought not*, the feelings of guilt and shame, of duty and responsibility, and that these facts and feelings must be explained in such a manner that their reality will not vanish in the process of explanation, we ask can the physiological theory accomplish this task? The series of moral facts is so different from a physiological series that we feel constrained to answer at once in the negative. How is it possible to produce the authoritative conscience from mere physiological process? When the physiologist attempts to do this we find him invariably making unwarrantable assumptions to help him over the difficulty. When he appears to have accomplished his task it will be found, as has been pithily observed, that “he has not been careful to exclude the unnoticed germs of morality from other sources, but has worked all the time in an atmosphere charged with moral influences.” Consciously or unconsciously, writers of this school are in the habit of incorporating into their reasonings what does not belong to them,—moral intuitions which we hold to be the possession of man from a higher source and which, of right, belong to the theory of morals which they are seeking to overthrow.

What place can moral intuitions and volitions have in a system that seeks to explain everything by physiological and mechanical process? If man be but part of an unbroken series of cause and effect; if his thoughts, feelings and volitions are determined simply like occurrences in the physical world, like the rising of a water jet or falling of a stone, where is there room for “conscience,” “responsibility,” “right,” “duty” as these