

and the defence of England and England's colonies must again revert to these gallant yeomen.

"England's peculiar and appropriate sons,
Known in no other land. Each boasts his hearth
And field as fine as the best Lord his barony.
Owning subjection to no human vassalage,
Save to their King and laws:
Hence are they resolute.
Leading the van on every day of battle
As men who know the blessings they defend;
Hence are they frank and generous in praise,
As men who have their portion in its plenty.
No other kingdom shows such worth or happiness,
Vell'd in such low estate."

Therefore Canada need be no longer an excuse for the *laissez faire* policy of timorous Statesmen—the people have a country to fight for and are prepared to take their full share in its defence.

A Naval defence of Canada to be effective must aim at acquiring the command of the Great Lakes and retaining the same. Following the system laid down in a former paper the duty of a Naval force would be to cover the frontier effectually and make invasion in force impossible, while the disposition of the lines of defence as previously detailed would make it impracticable on the only exposed front offered to the enemy, provided an advance in that direction were possible. All the lines of communication connecting the lines of Military defence with each other and the Seaboard are in the rear—offer no assailable point on the flank presented to the United States and are altogether inaccessible as long as the controul of the High Seas can be maintained by Great Britain. It follows, therefore, that the duty of the Empire is to keep her Naval power in the highest state of efficiency, and the cost of defending Canada will be solely confined to the temporary supply of arms and ammunition. A large Naval force on the Lakes would materially lessen if not altogether prevent actual fighting on Canadian soil and reduce the cost of defence to a minimum; consequently the Naval defence of the Province is the primary object with which its Military defence must be combined. But we lack a system by which the whole available strength of the population could be put forth on an emergency, a system that would best suit our social condition, that would make any man capable of handling a rifle a soldier without destroying his distinctive character as a farmer, mechanic, merchant, or professional man. The country does not want barrack nor barrack-trained soldiers, but it wants the "drill-shed" and "armory" in every township and the regular and systematic training of the people at times and seasons best suited to their own convenience. Will the proposed Militia Bill give the country this great blessing; will it provide for training an efficient Naval reserve; or will its provisions be such as will afford our Legislators an opportunity for querulous opposition or captious interference—*cui bono?*

At present every thing is disorganised—the Reserve Militia exist only on paper; the

Active Militia are not officered but merely enrolled, consequently worthless; the Volunteers are gradually melting away, dissolving "like the baseless fabric of a vision." For thirteen eventful years the patriotism of individuals have been performing the duty which the state owes to itself; sneered at by the selfish and indolent, neglected and legislated for by the Government, it is hard to imagine a less encouraging position than those gallant men have occupied. In fact, were it not for the spirit which pervades the whole mass of the population it is hardly possible that the Volunteer organisation, such as it is, could have been sustained, and it would be hard to tell whether Government neglect or legislation have been most injurious to its interests. But as an evidence that the people of Canada mean to fight for their country—if occasion should arise the Volunteer organisation is sufficiently decisive in that respect—it stands alone and unrivalled in modern history. A few men undertaking against every disadvantage and at great pecuniary outlay to defend the country and maintain a force at their own expense for that purpose, is a spectacle as unique as magnificent, but the Government that permits this sacrifice or the people who accept it are not doing their duty to the country. The defence of Canada is the business of every individual in the Province, rich and poor; the former because it will enhance the value of his property, the latter because it will enable him to share the prosperity which security brings.

This whole question of defence admits of no doubts respecting its successful issue. Many will naturally ask "is there any necessity for it?" Not just now; but who can tell what a day may bring forth, in the face of the disturbing causes which are at work in the social condition and political system of our neighbours. To be thoroughly armed is to be thoroughly secure; and moreover, it enhances our credit in Great Britain because it relieves the Empire from a feeling of weakness which must materially affect her foreign relations and operate against her financial and commercial prosperity. It is therefore incumbent on the people of Canada to arm for their own interests, insecurity begets distrust, and that prevents capital from being invested in the Dominion.

A system of Naval and Military defence must be organised before present security or future welfare can be assured.

THE NOVA SCOTIAN DIFFICULTY.

The determined opposition evinced by the Nova Scotians to the measure of confederation offers at the outset a very serious obstacle to the establishment and harmonious working of the constitution of the new Dominion. This is greatly to be deplored, for the political evils which distracted these colonies previous to the union of the four provinces were of such a nature as to cause much anxiety for their future peace

and prosperity. Looking at this unhappy division of feeling which separates the people of Nova Scotia from those of the sister Provinces from an historical point of view, we find that the present state of affairs is hardly to be wondered at. After the successful rebellion of the American colonies, the Home Government, perceiving that the intimate union which had subsisted between the rebel states was one of the secrets of their successful resistance to the Imperial authority, adopted a line of policy in reference to the remaining colonies which was calculated to keep them divided from each other by separate laws and rival and often antagonistic interests. Each colony had its own government, its own tariff, its own courts of law; each with a system perfectly distinct and without reference to the others. This state of things was carefully fostered and encouraged by the Imperial Government for many years, and succeeded to a demonstration in producing the desired effect. The Provinces were completely divided from each other by this policy of isolation, and if at the present day it is found exceedingly difficult to weld together communities which have been studiously kept asunder for more than three quarters of a century, the difficulty is no indication of a just cause for marvelling: it is only the natural effect of certain causes set in motion for the purpose of producing a desired end. Unhappily for the Dominion, this policy has only been too successful; but if the people who so loudly declaim against confederation were to awaken to a true sense of their position, and, while divesting their minds of passion and prejudice, calmly examine the matter in the light of reason and common sense, not to mention expediency, they would find this huge mountain of wrong against which they so bitterly complain, and which has its principal existence more in their imaginations than otherwise, growing "gradually small and beautifully less," till it disappears forever.

The geographical position and social condition of the Dominion are such as to imperatively require the retention of the Maritime Provinces among its component parts, and no means conformable to British usage should be left untried to do away with the present unhappy differences; and while rendering all content within our borders, provide for the admission of the sister provinces at present standing aloof from us. Viewed from a military and strategical point, which must always be closely connected with our naval and mercantile interests, we find again every reason urge us to keep our communications open to the sea. While upon this subject we would enter our protest against the foolish and mischievous humbug to which we are occasionally treated under the heading of annexation, and it is with the deepest regret that we perceive our fellow subjects in Nova Scotia, whose best interests are bound up with British connection and the new Dominion, covertly hinting