of which is "(*a*) To promote, in such ways as may from time be time be determined, the principle that human conduct should be based upon human knowledge, and not upon supernatural belief; and that human welfare in this world is the proper end of all thought and action." The remaining objects, regarded separately, were admittedly (so far as they were not tainted by being merely ancillary to the first one) lawful in themselves, such as the secularisation of the State and education, the recognition of marriage as a purely civil contract, and of Sunday as a purely civil institution, and so forth. The appellants were the heir-at-law and next of kin of the testator, and their contention was that the gift of residue to the society failed on the ground that the primary object of the society involved illegality. Mr. Justice Joyce, in the Chancery Division, and Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Lords Justices Pickford and Warrington, in the Court of Appeal, had held that there was nothing necessarily illegal in the society's objects, and that therefore the bequest was valid: *Re Bowman*; *Secular Society Limited* v. *Bowman* (113 L.T. Rep. 1095; (1915) 2 Ch. 447).

The appeal was argued in January and February last, before the Lord Chancellor, Lords Dunedin, Parker of Waddington, Sumner, and Buckmaster. In the result, the Lord Chancellor alone was for allowing the appeal, the other four noble and learned Lords (Lord Dundein, after some hesitation) for dismissing it. The appeal accordingly stood dismissed, and (as was resolved on further consideration on Thursday, the 17th inst.) with costs. It was surely by the irony of fate that the House (as Lord Bowen would have said) dismissed Christianity with costs on Ascension Day—a *dies nefasta*.

The main contention of the appellants was two-fold: (1) that it is criminal to attack the Christian religion, however decent and temperate may be the form of attack; and (2) that a court will not assist in the promotion of such objects as that for which the society was formed, whether they are criminal or not.

On the first question, it now emerges as clear law from the entire final tribunal (including herein the otherwise dissentient opinion of the Lord Chancellor), that a decent and temperate