

any scrutiny, or he may carefully examine them, weigh them in his hand, and ring them on the table to test their quality and accept or reject according to the evidence. In the first case he has no faith either in the money or in my sincerity. In the second, he believes without evidence. In the third, when he accepts them he exercises a rational faith. In this case, if the money happens to be counterfeit, infidelity and credulity fare alike. Unbelief loses nothing, credulity gains nothing. If genuine, credulity is more profitable than unbelief. The only safety in either case lies in rational belief, or rejection. Still it is plain that in such a case the position of the infidel is the least safe, and therefore less likely to meet with general acceptance. The temptation of Eve by Satan, as recorded in Genesis, presents a happy mixture of appeal to credulity and unbelief, but the former preponderates. Thus we return to the idea that credulity is more likely to be current and dangerous than unbelief, and that there is therefore more need to warn men against the former than against the latter. I am the more convinced of this by considering the points raised by the earlier papers in this Symposium.

Principal Grant discusses unbelief in inspiration, and very properly traces much of it to previous credulity in false and exaggerated views. But he goes on to shew that the reaction from these ultra orthodox views into unbelief implies an equal if not a greater degree of credulity of another kind. Common sense shows that belief in Robertson Smith, Driver and Wellhausen implies a corresponding (I do not say absolute) unbelief in Moses and in Jesus Christ. But may not the faith in the newer men imply a certain amount of credulity? I may be quite unable to follow out in detail the minute investigations and arguments of the critics. If so, my faith in them can scarcely be of the rational kind. True they are specialists—experts perhaps. But then in all other subjects specialists are known to be the most dangerous men to follow, except within the narrow limits of their own field, and even there only with due regard to the correlation of their results with those of other kinds of specialists. The more narrow and microscopic specialists are, the more do they need to be watched. This is true of physical and natural science, and probably much more so in matters of minute verbal criticism, where so much is uncertain or admits of different explanations. I am surely somewhat credulous if, on such grounds, very imperfectly apprehended by me, and not at all clearly proved, I set myself in opposition to the facts of Jewish history, and the discoveries of modern archæology, and the testimony of ancient