

constitute a beneficent action on the part of the whole world to prevent a conflagration. Of course everyone knew that the real object of the Article was to secure the assent to the Covenant of the United States Senate, who were very sensitive and had in mind such contingencies as the acquisition by Japan of Magdalena Bay in Mexico. The Senate feared that without such an article Japan might suddenly acquire this region by purchase and then, if any question were raised, the League might sanction the step.

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Sir Robert Borden pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine was really no part of international law, but was merely a principle of United States foreign policy, and had indeed been formulated in the first instance at the instigation of Great Britain when Canning was Foreign Secretary. At the outbreak of war, there had been in the United States Press much discussion and agitation concerning the bearing of the Doctrine in the event of a German invasion of Canada. The Americans had asked themselves whether they would be obliged to intervene to protect Canada. This had caused much anger and resentment in Canada, and he had found it necessary to take notice of the discussion in public. It was, of course, in the circumstances, a somewhat delicate task, but he had found a formula. He had explained in a speech that the Monroe Doctrine was not to be found in any article of international law, that it was simply a principle of the foreign policy of the United States enunciated as such by their own statesmen, and that its validity was dependent upon the extent to which the United States were willing to enforce it. As a part of the policy of a friendly country promulgated for its own guidance, it was entitled to such respect as other countries usually paid in such circumstances. It was for the United States under these conditions to define the limits of their own policy. But, on the other hand, it would be understood that in the event of any foreign invasion Canada did not rely on the Monroe Doctrine but upon her own intention and capacity to protect herself.

Sir Joseph Cook thought that, in the circumstances, the President ought to take occasion to interpret the Doctrine for the benefit of other members of the League.

Lord Robert Cecil said that it might be possible to suggest to the President that he should do this in a speech, which he might make in presenting the revised draft.

Sir Robert Borden said that it would be inadvisable to attempt any further definition in the Article itself. To do so would only be to stir up the United States Senate and make matters worse.

Mr. Massey was still of the opinion that it was objectionable to grant a special favour to the United States.

Lord Robert Cecil replied that the President had admitted that the Article neither added to nor detracted from the League, but simply left the thing where it was before. Such influential Americans as ex-President Taft and Senator Root, whose international purposes were above reproach, were anxious for the Article, and in all the circumstances it did not seem to be