

4. The President requested that the warning to Japan should not be delivered until he had had a reply from the Japanese Emperor to the appeal which he contemplated making to him. Kurusu had indirectly communicated to the President a suggestion that such a direct appeal might possibly lead to negotiations on a new basis, which might lead to a truce and even a settlement between Japan and China. The President hesitated for some time over making this appeal but finally sent it either on Saturday or early on Sunday. In his appeal he asked for a withdrawal of Japanese forces from Indo-China in return for a guarantee from the United States, and the governments of the East Indies, Malaya, Thailand and China that they would not invade Indo-China.

5. On Sunday morning the United Kingdom sent the Dominions and the President the draft of a warning to Japan, and expressed the hope that the Dominions would concur in the note and permit the British Ambassador in Tokyo to present it as a joint communication. Canada immediately replied that it was instructing its chargé d'affaires in Tokyo to deliver a simultaneous note associating Canada completely with the British representations. Canada also urged amendments to the note.

6. While these negotiations were going on the United Kingdom was preparing for an outbreak of hostilities. On Friday it sent instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet. On Saturday the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet reported that two Japanese troop convoys had been sighted early that morning off Cambodia Point steaming westwards, and later north-west.