

A. D. 1748. their point, in that way of negociation, to strengthen themselves upon the premises, and to support a bad argument by force of arms.

Such was the situation of affairs in America, and the most certain index of the measures taken by the French, upon the signing of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; in which they gained this singular advantage, to encourage them to proceed in their usurpations in North America; namely, That, notwithstanding it was notorious to all the world, that the increase of their territory and the diminution of our power, on that continent, had been the object of the French councils, ever since the treaty of Utrecht; and that hostilities were commenced in those parts, before the war; the British ministry, neither availed themselves of the war to dispossess the French of our property; nor, when they were negotiating a peace, does it appear, that they paid any regard to a point of the last importance to Great Britain. If his Majesty's plenipotentiaries received no instructions on that head, it could not be owing to the want of intelligence; for it is certain that repeated remonstrances were transmitted from the Governors of our colonies against the practices of the French; which scarce can be thought to have miscarried; or to have been destroyed or neglected by them in power.

Weakness of the British ministry.

Great Britain, ever credulous, was the only power that disarmed, and could not believe any latent evil design, in the measures taken, by her perfidious neighbours, to break the peace. Even

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