it shall go out" Mr. Fleming also said that Canada's efforts to help the Hungarian patriots were inadequate.

Opening his review of the actions of Canada and the United Nations in relation to the world's two trouble spots, Mr. L.B. Pearson first dealt with the charge that Canada was the chore boy of the United States. "Our record over the last years gives us the right to say we have performed and will perform no such role," Mr. Pearson said, and he added that while it is bad to be a chore boy of the United States, "it is equally bad to be a colonial chore boy running around shouting 'Ready, aye, ready'".

ENDURING PURPOSE EXPOSED

Turning to the events in Hungary, the Secretary of State for External Affairs said the recent actions of the Soviet Union in Hungary throw a lurid light on the protestations that Stalinism is now dead and peaceful co-existence is here There has never been, Mr. Pearson said, a more significant exposure of the underlying and, he was afraid, enduring purpose and methods of Soviet power. In this situation. Canada can, as she is doing, help the victims of this terror, and can keep, through the United Nations, the spotlight of world public opinion on the savage actions of the Soviet Union. The United Nations must continue to endeavour to bring the United Nations into Hungary in the role of observers and investigators, Mr Pearson said, but it would be wrong to hold out to the Hungarians promises of liberation by force which at this time it would be impossible to fulfil.

Introducing his remarks on the Middle East, Mr. Pearson first sketched the background of events in that area. He said that Egyptian policy had been unfriendly to the western powers, had been arbitrary in the seizure of the Suez Canal, and had witnessed a gradual increase of Russian influence in Egypt and the Middle East. Then too, he said, it had been obvious that there had been no meeting of minds between Washington and London in these matters, that the fault was by no means entirely on the side of London and France, and that "the vital importance of the Suez to Western Europe is perhaps not appreciated in Washington".

Canada's attitude had been that this question should be brought as quickly as possible to the United Nations and a solution attempted there, that there should be no division of opinion, no division of policy, between Washington and London and Paris on a matter of such vital importance, and that there should be no action taken by anybody which could not be justified under the United Nations charter.

Eventually the matter was taken to the Security Council, Mr. Pearson said, and certain principles for a settlement of the Suez question were agreed upon. One of these principles, which was accepted by Egypt, was that

the canal should be insulated from the policies of any one nation, including Egypt. Through these conversations at the Council and through conversations going on in the Secretary-General's office, there was "some hope that an international solution might be reached which might be satisfactory to all concerned".

At this point, Mr. Pearson said, the Israeli Government moved against Egypt. Admitting, as he was sure all members in the House must admit, the provocations which may have prompted Israel's move, Mr. Pearson said the Government "did at that time, and do now, regret that the attack was made at that time and under those circumstances".

Continuing, Mr. Pearson said:

"Then, as the House knows, the United Kingdom Government and France intervened in the matter on the ground, so they claimed, that it was necessary to keep the fighting away from the Suez Canal and thereby keep the canal open. They wished, so they said, in Paris and London, to keep a shield between the opposing forces...

"...To carry out that purpose, as we know, the French and British Governments sent an ultimatum to Egypt and to Israel, a 12 hour ultimatum, that was accepted by Israel, whose forces at that time had come within ten miles of Suez, but was rejected by Egypt which had been asked to withdraw its forces beyond the Suez Canal; and following that rejection the United Kingdom and French forces intervened, by air and later on the ground."

COMPLETE SURPRISE

Mr. Pearson said that, far from gratuitously condemning the action, the Canadian Government expressed regret at the necessity for the use of force in these circumstances, circumstances that included an element of complete surprise "on our part at the action taken" and the breaking down of consultation between London and Paris on the one hand, and the Commonwealth capitals and Washington on the other.

Canada had, Mr. Pearson continued, immediately begun to pursue a policy, both here by diplomatic talks and diplomatic correspondence, and later at the United Nations, "which would bring us together again inside the Western Alliance and which would bring about peace in the area on terms which everbody could accept". Canada's policy, he said, was to seek through the United Nations a solution which would be satisfactory to all sides.

At the United Nations Canada had been anxious to avoid the creation of a vacuum of chaos in the Middle East after the fighting had stopped, had maintained that the situation leading up to the aggression should be given due consideration and constructive action taken to prevent such a situation recurring again; had wished to prevent any formal condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as

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