

"Unmet demands for back pay, displeasure with their spartan accommodations and meagre rations, and distrust that they would indeed receive that which they had been promised, all contributed to the registered soldiers' unruliness. But most of all, they wanted to go home and restart their lives."⁷⁹

Disturbances at non-Assembly registration areas, known as CTNAs⁸⁰, were even more problematic. Although a higher percentage of Government soldiers reporting to the CTNAs did want to join the FADM than their AA counterparts, the overall numbers were once again much below what the parties had expected. In addition, soldiers began to create "spontaneous CTNAs" by setting up roadblocks and demanding the same food and benefits they believed other soldiers were receiving.

The mounting tension and violent outbursts convinced the UN and the international donor community, ever mindful of what had occurred in Angola, that substantially more was required in the way of reintegration benefits. The result was the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) for soldiers registered and demobilized at either the AAs or the CTNAs and, as of June 1994, even the approximately 14,000 government soldiers demobilized before the GPA was signed. The RSS provided payments representing a further 18 months' pay, together with a country-wide information and referral service, an occupational skills development programme and a fund to promote the involvement of ex-combatants in activities in their respective communities. Administered by the UNDP, its budget eventually amounted to \$31.9 million, of which \$27.6 million had been pledged, but only \$8.9 million received, by the end of the ONUMOZ mandate.

The disarmament mandate for ONUMOZ, in line with the GPA and the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council of 3 December 1992, was to place under United Nations control all weapons and ammunition, to have destroyed under close UN supervision all weapons not required by the new armed forces and to introduce from the outset a programme for the removal of weapons from the civilian population.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Berman, *op.cit.*, p. 72.

⁸⁰ The areas, mainly military installations, were meant to facilitate registration by soldiers who did not require billeting.

⁸¹ See in particular Part III, paragraph 18(b)(i)-(iii) of the Secretary-General's Report of 3 December, 1992.